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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I shall defend the thesis that Question 1, Article 53 of his
Summa represents an unexpected epistemic sensitivity in the teachings of Henry of
Ghent. By this, I mean that his discussion of the persons in the Trinity hints at an
awareness of certain epistemic consequences or assumptions at play in the
metaphysical use of terms like person, substance, universal, and so on. This
acknowledgement is unique and original among his contemporaries.
My argument establishes Henry’s position in context with the traditions he
inherited by demonstrating the ways in which it is related to the problem of
individuation, how it is distinct from the positions held by his contemporaries, and why
it represents the epistemic shift that scholars like Jorge J.E. Gracia attribute to the
University system of the Late 13th and Early 14th Centuries. I situate Henry’s discussion
of divine personhood in the context of his teachings on relation to show the difference
between his treatment of a purely metaphysical issue and one which he takes to require
linguistic and logical considerations. I then offer a careful exegesis and analysis of the
text at hand, working through his consideration of the term ‘persona’ as it operates in
comparison with seven other similar terms. I argue that the epistemic implications of
this exercise become an integral part of the framework for the remainder of the article.
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Yes, this is a metaphysical account of personhood, insofar as it is an attempt to
define the real nature of the subject in question. But, Henry initiates this inquiry by way
of asking how the term ‘persona’ applies. For example, he considers whether it is a term
of first or second intention, whether it applies to the actual individual or the universal
concept, and so on. These are epistemic questions. Prior to this study, a discussion of
the persons in the Trinity may not have seemed an obvious, or even helpful, place to
look for Henry’s theory of universals. Yet, here it is. And no one that I know of prior to
Henry began this way, or, if they did they did not make this explicit in their metaphysical
analyses. That alone is interesting enough to merit the following study.
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PREFACE
Henry of Ghent taught in the Theology Faculty at the University in Paris in the
last quarter of the thirteenth century. Now regarded as one of the most significant
thinkers of his time, his thought represents the intersection between the two great
medieval pillars, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, and was developed on the cusp
of the philosophical boom of the 14th century that gave rise to the Renaissance.1 As a
prolific writer, an advisor to the sitting Pope, and an authorized witness and actor in the
historical events surrounding the condemnations of 1277, Henry was an active
intellectual. He was also a secular theologian. (He did not affiliate himself with an order
of Friars, like the Franciscans or Dominicans.) As a result, his works did not benefit from
the same sort of organization and preservation shown to some of his contemporaries.
Nonetheless, his unique position establishes Henry as a hallmark figure of the rise of the
University in the High Middle Ages.
The first printed editions of Henry’s work were compiled by Badius in 1518.2 And
until recently, served as the standard text for scholarship regarding his thought. But a
contemporary effort is now well underway to produce a modern critical edition. Under
the auspices of the Katholik Universitate Leuven, a devoted group of Henry scholars are

1

Wilson, G. A., ed., (2011). A Companion to Henry of Ghent, Leiden-Boston: E.J. Brill. (Brill’s Companions
to the Christian Tradition, 23). Preface. ISBN 978-90-04-18349-0.
2
Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. (ed. Badius, Paris, 1520.)
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carefully putting forth the Opera Omnia series, which includes both his Quodlibeta and
his Summa. (What Henry referred to as his Quaestiones ordinariae.) The most recent
text prepared for publication in the series was article 53 of the Summa.
I had the great privilege of working on this project under the tutelage of Dr.
Gordon Wilson, the current general editor for the series. From the early stages of
variation collations and tracing down manuscript family trees to the final stages of
proofreading and tracking down footnote sources- I lived with this text for several years.
And while a paleographer’s task is like the scribe’s (concerned primarily with the
accurate transmission of the text), the philosopher in me could not help but notice the
content of the material I was transcribing.
Article 53 is comprised of ten questions concerning ‘Those Things That Pertain to
the Distinction of the Persons.’ The first question asks, ‘Whether it is necessary to hold
that there is a person in God.’ That is a very interesting and unexpected place for Henry
to begin. He does not immediately invoke the authority of scripture, nor assume an
agreement upon the meaning of relevant terms. He begins the discussion by getting his
ideas, his terms, the language- clear. He is interested in getting to the heart of the way
in which we think about, and talk about, the notion of personhood. Is it a necessary tool
to use? There is no point, so it is implied, in arguing around the problems attached to
the term, if the term serves no good purpose, or if there is another term which might
serve our purposes more accurately. Acknowledging this, Henry considers those terms
which are relevant to the persons of the Trinity- asking of each ‘does this term do a
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better job at referencing the divine, and our concept of the divine, than the term person
does?’ As we will see, he believes the alternate terms fail at the task. Thus, he concludes
that ‘persona’ serves as a unique placeholder, linguistically and conceptually, for an
incommunicable aspect of the essential nature of certain created and uncreated beings.
This small, perhaps seemingly clerical, question demonstrates the ways in
which, for Henry, the notion of personhood is intricately tied to many of his most
notable teachings- on the Trinity, essence and existence, the notion of relation, freewill, and so on. It is a jumping off point for a much larger conversation about
signification, concept formation, and Henry’s infamous ‘intentional distinction.’ And yet,
it remains to be seen whether Henry has a comprehensive philosophy of personhood, as
such. If he does, it behooves us to uncover it. For, while there is now a consensus
amongst Henry scholars on several points, there is also active and vigorous debate. (The
recent publication of Brill’s Companion to Henry of Ghent stands as a shining example.) I
hope this project contributes to our growing understanding of his impressive and
comprehensive body of work.
Because this is the first undertaking of its kind since the re-introduction of this
text into the larger body of modernly updated, available works, certain situational
matters need to be addressed. There is a context to this discussion as a piece of
literature- In what manner was this text conceived, written, and presented? What
background knowledge is assumed of the audience? What other texts, or thinkers, or
discussions should be presumed as relevant? (Such issues are significant when
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approaching thinkers writing in the universities of Europe during the High Middle Ages
since they highlight the particularities of an academic culture which directly influenced
the form and style of their words.) Textual and historical details being established, the
content of the text, the arguments put forth therein, can properly be considered.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTIONS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS: PERSONS, INDIVIDUALS, & UNIVERSALS
As we will see in the exegesis of the fourth chapter, Henry discusses individuals
and universals on his way towards considering the divine persons. He is reacting to
certain traditions and philosophical problems as he does so. They offer insight into his
treatment of the terms. For example, about ten years before Henry is writing in Paris
(1277), Roger Bacon discusses the situation of the philosophical problem of
individuation. He points out the ways in which explanations of individuation could go,
such as those theories worked out by Bonaventure and Aquinas. Roger Bacon and Henry
of Ghent each contributed to the development of these positions that happened
between 1250 and 1300. So, I include brief summaries of the framework here.
In the High Middle Ages, the standard theological textbook was Peter Lombard’s
Book on the Sentences. The section on the individuation of angels, specifically, provided
Medieval thinkers an interesting challenge by which to test their theories of
individuation. The conversation quickly broadens from angels to matter, in general.
Given God’s complete freedom and omnipotence, the issue was whether God
could create several individuals of the same species. (The question is focused on what
accounts for a certain thing being an individual distinct from other individuals. As
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opposed to what accounts for certain things being the same over time.3) For these
thinkers, ‘individuum’ was defined as something ‘undivided in itself.’ Of course, the
matter is further complicated by types of division.4 But it was largely agreed upon by the
Mid-13th Century that to be an individual was to be undivided. There was also consensus
that created things belonged to natural kinds, or species, and that there could be
several instances of the same species if those things shared a common essence. Angels,
furthermore, were considered individuals.
Saint Bonaventure:
Bonaventure posits that all created things are composites of matter and form. For
him, matter was the equivalent of potentiality and form was roughly the same as
actuality. Thus, every creature is a composite because every creature is the result of the
actualization of contingent potentialities. In other words, things could have been
otherwise. As he put it, limited and changeable.5 According to Bonaventure’s
framework, God is distinct from creatures because he lacks composition. Angels,
however, are material/spiritual composites. (Material by quantity, not corporeity or
extension.) So, angels may be different in kind from corporeal species, but they are
individuated in the same way. Namely, through the union of matter and form. This also
3

Also known as synchronic individuation, as opposed to diachronic individuation.
Subject/Predicate, Whole/Parts… Something might be divided into integral parts. Such as Socrates is
divided by his soul and body, and his body is divided by his arms and legs… Or, something may be divided
into subjective parts. For example, the essence human being is divided into Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
If the whole cannot be predicated of its parts, those parts are integral. By contrast, if the whole can be
predicated by its parts, those parts are subjective. As Georgio Pini summarizes, “When an individual is
described as what is ‘undivided in itself’, the sort of indivisibility that is being referred to is indivisibility
into subjective parts. The point is that something is an individual if and only if it is uninstantiable.” (Pini
p.3)
5
Pini, 2012. N.9.
4
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allows him to account for multiple instances of the angel species, because form itself is
not what is doing the individuating. Its therefore possible to have the same form or
essence instantiated in multiple material supposites. Thus, matter becomes integral to
the discussion.
Thomas Aquinas:
Thomas Aquinas diverges from the tradition to present an alternative set of
starting premises. First, he held that angels were instances of pure form (what he called
‘separate substances’) not received in matter. (They were immaterial because they are
pure minds and minds are immaterial.) And secondly, that form could be numerically
multiplied only if is received in matter. (Which, for Aquinas, is always extended matter.
And forms, like whiteness, cannot be divided into instantiations by themselves as forms
alone.) From which, he concluded, there cannot be several angels of the same species.
But, rather, there must be as many individual angels, with as many individual essences,
as there are species. Bonaventure would have rejected the first premises. Most who
followed, however, take issue with the second. Whether or not Aquinas was successful
is another matter. But he did relate individuation and universality with immateriality
and intelligibility in a new, unique way. And he opened a new space for thought on the
problem of individuation. Because under his schema, there can be a created individual
which is individual by itself and not divisible into instantiations.6 For material things,
matter acts as the principle of multiplication and individuation. But immaterial things,

6

This is the materia signata, or designated matter.
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like angels, can be individual not by common essences but by a principle of individuation
as their essence.
On March 7, 1277, the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, with the assistance of a
council of theologians (including Henry of Ghent), issued a Condemnation of 220 theses
purportedly being taught at the University at Paris. Three of these concerned the
problem of the individuation of angels. (Articles 81, 96, 191.) Clearly attributed to
Aquinas, they sought issue with the idea that no two angels could belong to the same
species. The trouble seemed to be with the implication of a limitation upon God’s
omnipotence, or ability to create with complete freedom. But, what is important for our
purposes here is to consider the academic environment and discussions in which Henry
found himself a part of. The controversy over individuation certainly would have been
familiar to him as he takes up the subject of personhood and individuation in his
Summa.
Henry of Ghent:
Henry points out that both frameworks, by Bonaventure and Aquinas alike, fail
to satisfy the problem behind the condemnation. The difficulty is that the nature of
created beings (whether material or immaterial) places restrictions upon God’s ability as
creator. He rejects this line of thinking by maintaining that all created essences are
common and individualized, not by matter, but by something else added to them.

4

Henry dealt with the issue of the individuation of angels, specifically, in two
places: Quodlibet 2, question 8 and Quodlibet 5, question 8.7 These two treatments
demonstrate an evolution in Henry’s thoughts on the subject. In Quodlibet 2, Henry
takes issue with the implication that angels are necessary beings. He maintains that
Aquinas provides a view which entails the divinity of angels because they are individual
essences they cannot fail to exist. (As established by Henry’s link between actual
existence and individuation. Since he maintained that whatever does not actually exist,
exists as a mental construct, and therefore, as a universal.) He does not reject the idea
completely. He admits that individuation can occur through the instantiation of matter,
just rejects that it is the only way. He allows for a difference here between created and
uncreated being.
A few years later, in his fifth Quodlibet, Henry treats matter as the ‘secondary
principle of individuation.’ Here he states that any essence, whether material or
immaterial, is made individual by a primary principle of individuation. (By this point, the
focus is larger than that of angels. It is a problem in all types of things and beings.) This
primary principle is the double negative property of not being divided in itself and not
being the same as anything else. (In other words, not being multiply instantiated and
not being distinct.) The difference, or evolution, lies in the rejection of a need for some
extra, positive capacity for multiplication. It is based on his distinction between
potentiality and possibility. Something may be inclined to be numerically multiplied,
according to Henry, but this is not the same as saying it is possible for an essence to be
7

Pini, 2012. N.52.
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numerically multiplied. The possession of an inclination implies the possession of a
positive feature. A certain form must receive that inclination by way of a real entity like
matter. In conjunction, it is also possible for something to be multiply instantiated even
in the absence of a positive feature, so long as it does not contradict another feature.
Henry identified a sense of possibility as non-repugnance which is different from the
standard Aristotelian notion of potentiality. This is an important distinction for his own
solution to the problem of individuation.
Roger Bacon:
Roger Bacon’s Communia Naturalium was written in the 1260s, just a decade
before Henry was teaching in the Faculty of Arts.8 In it, Bacon lays out what he takes to
be the primary problems of individuation and universals, and how those problems have
led some of his peers to defend unsuccessful solutions.
He treats the problem of individuation in Chapter 9, claiming that its cause has
clearly arisen out of his discussion of universals and singulars, even though it as an
‘unresolved issue obscured by many false responses.’9 Three inadequate positions are
mentioned. First, there are those who ‘say that species is the whole essence of
individuals and that it only has different acts of being in them.’10 Second, there is the
position which holds that ‘matter added to universal form’ results in the individual.11
And third, ‘others maintain that potency is added to species as to a signature, and thus
8

1268-1270. (Hackett.)
Maloney, p.93. CN, par. 30.
10
Ibid., par.31.
11
Ibid., par.32.
9
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it is signified in different things.’12 These are false claims, Bacon argues, since neither
man (the universal) nor something added to man (some accidental feature to an
essence or matter to a form) makes this man (the individual). This man, the individual
man, is prior to man, the universal, ‘in the operation and intent of nature…an individual,
in as much as it is an individual, naturally has its own true being and essence first, before
its universal arises.’13 So neither a universal nor anything added to it is the cause of
individuation.
As this soul and this body make this man and as soul and body constitute man,
Bacon writes, the proper principles entering the essence of an individual constitute him.
He cites the seventh book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where Aristotle asserts that
universal man is composed of universal soul and universal body, and that this man is
composed of a particular soul and a particular body (in which one has this rational
element and this animal element). Thus, Bacon maintains that the individual is a
composition, and so too the universal. Given this criteria for a universal, he points out
that there could be endless universals- no first or last- certainly just as many as there are
individuals. So, the line of singulars must take precedence in nature over the
subordinated line of universals.
He then admonishes the sophists who poorly interpreted Aristotle’s words in On
the Heaven and the Earth, where Aristotle writes that when one speaks of the heavens,
they are speaking only of form, and when one speaks of man they are referring to form
12
13

Ibid., par.33.
Ibid., par.35.
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in matter. The incorrect interpretation is that matter added to specific form makes an
individual. ‘What is true,’ Bacon insists, ‘is that matter is not spoken of here in the same
sense as when it is the other part of a composite, nor as when it is a subject in
generation, but as that which is the foundation of something in which that thing would
consist.’14 Bacon interprets Aristotle to mean that matter as a subject is matter in which
there is an accident. In the same way, an individual is the matter in which exists a
universal. In this way, a universal is like an accident.
Next, he turns his attention to those who allege on the authority of Boethius that
species is the whole being of individuals, and again insists that the being of an individual
is twofold. (One is absolute according to those principles inhering in its essence and
does not imply species as the being of an individual. The other exists because of the
connection one individual has with another by virtue of a common nature, and that
being does constitute the species of the individual.)
What then does he suggest, if individuation is not caused by species or anything
added to it? He suggests we turn the question around and inquire into the cause of the
universal if it is neither the individual nor anything added to it. In other words, he
repeats, this whole question is foolish because it stems from the false dichotomy of
species/something added on to species, etc. There is no need for the construct. The
individual has its own properties, adhering in its own essence. The universal has its own
properties.

14

Maloney, p.94. CN, par.39.
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And as to those principles, like matter and form, and their cause of individuation,
Bacon asks what causes a universal to be a universal? It is so, they must say, because the
Creator made it so according to his propriety and its natures demands. And this goes on
for every instance of individuation and universal and is therefore finally dismissed as a
foolish pursuit.
The problem of universals, essentially, is whether universals exist in the mind or
outside of the mind. (This is similar to Porphyry’s question. When we say, ‘this is a tree’,
does the term signify something in the object or is it just a name?) But there is a
moderate path. So, he posits the question with a slight amendment. Do universals exist
in themselves, in the soul, or in things outside the mind? The solutions given, he
suggests, fall into the following possible categories:
1. Universals exist only in the mind. There is no universality which exists outside the
mind. (The ‘celebrated position’.)
2. The universal exists only in singulars/things and does not depend on the mind at
all.15 Universality affects only mental words/concepts. (Bacon)
3. Universal aspects exist outside the mind but inside the mind as universals. This
moderate realism draws a distinction between that which is conceived and the
way it is conceived.
(*3a. Universals exists as an intention- what can only be called universal in an
equivocal sense, as an abstracted likeness, species in the mind. It is in the thing

15

Communia Naturalium, p.102 1-3.
9

as an indeterminate. But it does not have proper existence outside or inside the
mind.)
4. Universals exist outside the mind, not in singulars, but as universal/ideal entities.
Bacon’s own solution to the problem is complicated and has garnered legitimate
debate. He distinguishes between the real universal and the mental universal.
Universals are not just, or only, the species as mental intention. They are extra-mental
as the basis for scientific objectivity. He maintains that the universal is either in the mind
or in things. A universal arises from common matter and common form, which are
always present with the proper matter and form, so have no need of being split apart.
Furthermore, the universal precedes the knowledge process because it is merely a
nature of which singulars agree. The particulars agree without any act of the mind. Yet
they occur and agree in existing individual supposites, not as separate Platonic forms.
Pointing to Boethius and Al-Ghazali, Bacon acknowledges the view of accidents
as the source of individuation. But rejects these accounts in favor of an interconnection
of form and matter. Since matter and form constitute the thing. For Bacon, an individual
is an individual and a substance. In the Parisian lectures he holds that matter is the
cause of individuation, but form is a co-cause. (The latter as an instrumental/formal
cause, rather than the principle cause.) In his later work, Communia Naturalium, he
holds consistent to these views, but offers new qualifications. His framework serves as
an alternative to what he understands as subordinating individuals to their universal.
“But if we would speak about the universal nature that is the directing power
of the universe, [we should say that] it intends and brings about an individual

10

first and principally, about which there is mention in the Book of the Six
Principles. Nature operates in a hidden manner in things: once a determinate
man is generated, man as such is generated. And the cause of this is that one
individual excels all universals in the world, for a universal is nothing but the
agreement of many individuals.” ([OHI,II], 94, = TTUM, 86)

Theodore Crowley (1950) and Jorge J. E. Gracia (1991) saw the beginnings of a kind
of nominalism in Bacon’s remarks. But more recently, focusing on Communia
Naturalium specifically, Thomas S. Maloney has made the case for reading Bacon as an
extreme realist.16 In this later treatise, we can at least say, the individual has ontological
power over genera and species. As Jeremiah Hackett summarizes, “His account becomes
an attack on contemporary positions influenced by Albertus Magnus that would
subordinate the individual to the universal. Species and genera are there for the sake of
the production of the individual.”17 For Bacon, certainly, the universal (whatever it is) is
tied up with and dependent upon the individual. He treats the universal as a common
nature in which particulars agree, extending into them and existing in them. And he
argues that without particulars, there can be no universals. They are related in the same
essential way matter and form are- they cannot be separated.
This is remarkably similar to the hesitations Henry demonstrates when speaking of
the divine persons as individuals for the very fact that they are inextricably linked to
universals. When we consider the account by Bacon in Communia Naturalium alongside
the philosophical problem of individuation discussed previously, it becomes clear that
Bacon’s teachings must have influenced Henry’s careful treatment of the subject in
Summa, Article 53, question 1. Bacon’s challenges certainly would have had some
16
17

Maloney, 1985.
Hackett, 2015. (Par.4.5)

11

impact on Henry, who no doubt read his predecessors provocation "Since the whole
rabble [at Paris] holds the contrary position, because of certain authorities, the views of
the latter must be presented" ([OHI,II], 96 =TTUM, 90).
And so, Henry inherits this rich debate about individuation, universals, matter
and form, and turns it from the subject of angels, to matter and form, to the question of
divine persons. Individuum, undivided in itself, is by now a complicated and problematic
notion. That understanding serves as explanation for Henry’s dismissal of the term in
favor of persona for conveying the proper nature of the persons in a monotheistic, yet
triune, God.

THE TEXT: SUMMA, ARTICLE 53, QUESTION 1
It is important to acknowledge this text as a part of Henry’s Summa, as opposed
to his Quodlibeta. As Gordon Wilson details in his contribution to the Brill Companion
series, Henry’s written legacy is nuanced and calls for careful consideration. The two
most significant works attributed to Henry, his Quodlibeta and Quaestiones ordinariae
(Summa) are two very different types of literature. Both represent an aspect of the
academic culture of the time but as separate genres.
The Quodlibeta are the result of public disputations, held in Paris during the Lent
and Advent seasons, where a master would voluntarily participate in an oral question
and answer session with the public. Any question could be posed of the master, and a
few days later the master came before the public to resolve them. The questions coming
from the audience were not under the control of the master, though he did have the

12

opportunity to produce a written version afterward so that certain ideas could be
expounded upon. The Quodlibetal material (15 in Henry’s case) are relevant to Henry’s
Summa for the purposes of dating as well as authentication. Because the Quodlibeta
were raised regularly over a period of fifteen years, almost the span of Henry’s career in
the Theology Faculty, they have become, as Gordon Wilson puts it “the Rosetta stone
for unlocking the dating of articles in Henry’s Quaestiones ordinariae.” 18 The Quodlibeta
make reference to the Summa (Qo) and vice versa, allowing scholars to authenticate
each as Henry’s own teachings and reconstruct the timeline of his writings.
Unlike the Quodlibeta, Henry was in complete control of his Quaestiones
ordinariae (Summa). Based upon his classroom lectures in the theology faculty in Paris,
these questions were chosen, formulated, and organized by Henry alone. There is a
reason to believe, by Henry’s own admission, that the Summa is unfinished. He intended
it to be two, symmetrical sections: one on God and the second on creatures. But,
presumably because of his death, the second section was never completed.
Nonetheless, what we do have stands as a purposefully constructed work on its own.
There are at least three stages in the transmission of Henry’s Summa. The first
was the delivery of the lecture. One assumes this oral stage involved preliminary notes
of some kind. The second stage was when Henry prepared a text, based on the lecture,
for the University. The third was when the university prepared an exemplar divided into

18

(2011b) “Henry of Ghent’s Written Legacy,” in G.A. Wilson, ed., A Companion to Henry of Ghent, LeidenBoston: E.J. Brill. (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, 23), p. 12.
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pecia for distribution to scholars and students.19 Due to the nature of teaching over
time, corrections were made, and variations arose across manuscript copies. For this
reason, it is difficult to concisely ‘date’ the Summa. There is the date of the original
lecture, the first composition given to the university, the transcription of the library
copy, or the availability of a bookstore model. Scholars are admittedly uncertain on this
topic. Raymond Macken suggested that articles 1-61 of the Summa were delivered to
the university for it to make its copy all at once at Paris in 1289. While R. Wielockx
proposed, based on a manuscript of Godfrey of Fontaine, that a copy was available
much earlier- perhaps as early as 1276. It is unclear whether the Summa came out in
one piece, or was gradually made available upon section completions, or finally
delivered as a whole posthumously.20
What we do know is that these questions are, in fact, the teachings of Henry of
Ghent, that they represent his thoughts and work on theology and philosophy while he
was teaching in the Theology Faculty at Paris21, and that they were originally written
sometime between 1275 and the remaining decade or more of his career.
Now that the critical edition of this text has been published, the great task of
translations and commentary can begin. The Latin is now ready for official translations

19

Ibid., p.14.
Ibid., p.15.
21
Including also his time as a member of the Faculty of Arts.
20

14

to accompany it. Roland Teske’s English translation of the Summa, article 53 was
published in 2014. I have used his translation exclusively here.22
In the fifty-third article of his Quaestiones Ordinarae (Summa), Henry of Ghent
considers ‘Those Things That (in God) Pertain to the Distinction of the Persons.’ By
‘things’ Henry means attributes, and he has just dealt (in article fifty-two) with those
attributes that in God pertain to the common substance. For Henry, the distinction of
the Persons is nuanced and requires a multi-faceted investigation. He develops the
following organization of what he takes those requirements to be:
A. Proper distinction between individual persons and the relations between them.
B. Proper distinction, of individual persons, as general or particular.
C. Proper distinction between persons and their properties.
D. Proper distinction between manner of being and emanation.
To properly address the matter of those things/attributes that pertain to the
distinction of the persons (in God), Henry takes up ten questions. Each of the ten
questions, in some way, deal with our understanding of God as having the attribute of
person, or the function/meaning of the language we use to develop and convey that
understanding. He begins, as mentioned above, with the question of whether it is
necessary to hold that there is a person in God. (And here, he carefully distinguishes
between the terms we use to talk about persons, or beings with similar attributes.
Essentially, he begins by clarifying and defining his terms.) Question two asks whether,
22
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in God, ‘person’ has being in God in a proper sense or a transferred sense. (Here, he
considers the sense/reference of the term as it relates to the real object.) And so on.
In these ten questions, we find a reflection on the traditional sources for a definition
of person, an original treatment of eight terms that are seemingly similar to the term
‘person,’ an attempt to reconcile Aristotelian notions with Augustinian ones, further
insight into Henry’s own theory of universals, and more. As the first formal exegesis and
analysis to be undertaken of Henry’s Summa, art.53 since its recent preparation for the
critical edition, we must begin with the first question- Henry’s treatment of eight terms,
as they pertain to the necessity of personhood in relation to the divine essence. In this
question, Henry specifically refers to the discussion of person he inherited. So, the next
chapter provides insight into the traditional sources he is attempting to reconcile. At
that point, the stage should be set for a proper examination of the text.
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CHAPTER 2
THE TRADITIONAL SOURCES
It is often said of philosophers (by other philosophers) that he or she ‘did not live
in a vacuum.’ This adage serves as a reminder that, while there is value in carefully
homing in on a text, or even a fragment of text, it is also important to consider the
larger context within which a thinker or idea is situated. For medieval thinkers, writing
as Henry did during the rise of the University, this consideration is almost a
requirement. (The nature of the material alone is an important aspect to include in
one’s investigations into a text, since the difference between a Summa and Quodlibetal
questions can also result in a difference in style or approach.) We will see, from the
onset of the first question, that Henry makes use of many sources and alludes to a
variety of thinkers throughout his own discussions. If one is unaware of the background
and details of these traditions, one will miss out on the full meaning of his references.
So, at this point, let us turn our attention to the traditional sources on the
distinction of the divine persons that Henry has inherited, and is responding to. While
he directly mentions three thinkers (Augustine, Boethius, and Richard of St. Victor),
there are other historical conversations happening in the background of the one
regarding the definition of person. Those are the ancient problem of language
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(articulated by Plato and Aristotle, regarding the relationship between thoughts, words,
and things), and a developing debate about individuation and universals.
I consider the traditional sources as addressing three separate, but related,
philosophical problems: Language, Personhood, and Individuation.

THE ANCIENTS & MEDIEVALS ON LANGUAGE
The thirteenth century may have seen a heightened sophistication in theories
about the relationship between language and reality, but the attempt at such a
formulation has ancient roots.
In the Cratylus, Plato expresses concern over the ways in which we might explain
the connection between words and the things they are meant to represent. He sets up
the dichotomy that this relationship is either one of mere convention (whereby any
name can be linked to anything, properly, if there is agreement) or some absolute
feature of reality (whereby certain words are naturally suited to represent certain
things). The standard interpretation of his theory of Forms has posited Plato, himself, as
a realist of the latter sort, but whether that is correct is not my concern here. What is
important is the distinction between the real and the linguistically agreed upon, and the
direction that Plato’s student, Aristotle, chose to take his own examinations in
response.23
In On Interpretation, Aristotle argues for the conventionalist understanding of
the relationship between words and things, claiming that a name is a spoken sound
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significant by convention. According to his semantic scheme, things in the world are
signified by words/symbols/sounds only through concepts (or as he calls them,
affections of the soul/mental images). These notions, or affections of the soul, are the
same for everyone (despite variance in sound/symbol/words) because they are affected
by the forms of reality which are also the same. Thus, these mental images- these
semantic intermediaries- are ‘universal.’
Following Aristotle, the Stoics picked up and expanded upon this idea of an
intermediate possibility between Plato’s original real/mental dichotomies. Giving
further attention to the project on the truth of sentences, begun by Aristotle in his
Categories, the Stoics developed their own ontology which consisted of signifiers, namebearers, and significations. (These significations, or lekta, were understood as states-ofaffairs.)24
Early medieval thinkers were influenced by these ancient debates, and both
Augustine and Boethius alike are deeply indebted to these earlier schemes. They
understood the relationship between words, thoughts, and things as such: written
symbols signify spoken utterances, which in turn signify a mental image (common to all
humans), and the terms of this image signify things in the world.25 However, Henry’s
medieval predecessors did not agree upon the details of this scheme, and many had
found themselves in trouble for the stances that they had taken as a result. Peter
Abelard, for example, considered the problems of language in relation to logic and
24
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accepted the usual causal scheme of signification, but diverged in his conceptualist
understandings of it. For Abelard, these universals do not actually exist in the world- in
fact, nothing exists in the world except particulars. The universals, signified by
predicates, are merely thought-content.
It is this sort of discussion that led to the 13th Century phenomenon referred to
as Boethius’ speculative grammar. The speculative grammarians sought to give grammar
the kind of universality required of an Aristotelian science. (In other words, they wanted
a scheme that extended beyond the Latin language in which they particularly worked.)
To accomplish this, they held a distinction between modes of being
(properties/attributes of things- like being pretty), modes of thinking (an intellect
thinking about an attribute- she is pretty), and modes of signifying (the linking process
which makes something a part of speech and adds features to it, such as case or tense).
This is the debate that the logicians and philosophers at Paris in the thirteenth
century inherited. And they were tasked with developing further the ways in which this
theory of language correlated with other theological and philosophical commitments.
And while Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham are usually put forth as representative of this
project, Henry was also significantly involved with it. Of interest to our purposes here,
this word-thought-thing relationship has deeply important implications for a theory of
the term ‘person.’
In the fifty-third article of his Summa, Henry directly mentions Augustine,
Boethius, and Richard of St. Victor. He returns to these three thinkers repeatedly
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throughout the article. For Augustine, Boethius, Richard of St. Victor, and Henry- the
features of terms have broader importance than grammatical correctness, especially
when it comes to terms that directly apply to the divine. And their idea of the divine
nature, and the words they used to signify the real thing, was one made up of three
persons.

DEFINITIONS OF PERSONHOOD
When it comes to discussions of individuality, and personhood more specifically,
one can see the influence of Boethius upon latter generations through the likes of
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and I argue, Henry. Yet, as we progress further- into late
scholasticism- one will see that references to his name and works begin to disappear
from both logical and metaphysical treatises on the subject. A large part of the reason
for this is what happened to Boethius’ writings during the High Middle Ages, when
thinkers such as Henry began to correct and critique them considering alternative
accounts. In Henry’s case, Boethius was believed to have been corrected by Richard of
St. Victor. So, borrowing from Richard’s framework, Henry develops his own account of
divine persons which seeks to improve upon the problematic arguments he had
inherited.
The attempts we see in Henry’s Summa, art.53, represent the ways in which
Boethius was slowly traded out for newer models, or at least, was subsumed into them
after having been adjusted to fit. Neither Augustine nor Boethius laid out a purposeful
treatise on individuality alone, so their ideas on such topics must be gleaned from
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fragments and statements found within other discussions. Nevertheless, one can
reconstruct a basic account of Boethius’ position from his three main Commentaries and
De Trinitate, as most of the Medievals understood it.26
As was suggested previously, Boethius’ De Trinitate was perhaps the most
influential text that Henry and his contemporaries relied upon to construct Boethius’
own views about personhood. The full title of this work highlights its theological nature
of the treatise- Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii. (Or, concerning how the
trinity is One God and not Three Gods.) The intentions behind this text were to show
how unity and multiplicity are reconciled in the divinity, which for Christian thinkers, is
monotheistic yet triune in nature. In this work, he attacks this project by contrasting the
notions of plurality and unity, and after examining the principle cause of the former,
argues that there can be no such notion attributed to God. (For, there are no accidental
or specific distinctions found in the divine nature.) For purposes of his discussion of
plurality, the key passage of the text for medieval thinkers became:
“The principle (ratio) of this union [i.e. the union of the trinity] is indifference.
Difference cannot be avoided by those who add to or take from [this unity],
as do the Arians, who, by positing degrees of merit within the Trinity, break it
up and convert it to plurality. For the source (principium) of plurality is
otherness; apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. And so, the
diversity between three or more things lies in genus or species or number. For
‘diverse’ is predicated of everything of which ‘the same’ (idem) is said. But
‘the same’ is said in three ways: By genus, as when a man [is said to be] the
same as a horse because their genus, animal, is the same. Or by species, as
when Cato [is said to be] the same as Cicero because [they belong] to the
same species, man. Or by number, as with Tully and Cicero, because he is one
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in number. This is why ‘diverse’ also is said by genus, species, and number.
But variety of accidents causes (facit) numerical difference. Three men differ
neither by genus nor species but by their accidents, for if we mentally remove
from them [all other] accidents, still each one occupies a different place
which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, since two bodies
cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore, it is
because they are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number.”27

One can distinguish, in this passage, three distinct issues. The first principle
identifies indifference (or lack of difference) as the source of all unity. The second is
concerned with various kinds of difference. And the last part of the passage identifies
the cause of numerical difference. In all three sections, a large part of the difficulty of
interpretation lies in Boethius’ unsystematic use of terminology. So, when we turn to
the issues contained within the problem of individuality below, we will see why this text
would have proved problematic for later thinkers who shared the basic intentions of the
overall goal- Boethius does not adequately address them. The intension of individuality
is not discussed here, though the intension of numerical difference is discussed
elsewhere.28 Extension and ontological status are not explicitly discussed, and neither is
the principle of individuation. And, Boethius offers little in the way of an examination of
discernibility or linguistic function.
Henry shares the intentions which are behind this text with Boethius. Namely, he
too wants to demonstrate how the univocal nature of the divine can be reconciled with
the notion of triune persons composing it. Where Henry disagrees with Boethius is the
extension of this notion of individuation to the nature of the divine persons. For, what
Boethius says in the same text about a person, brings up unique philosophical problems,
27
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not only for Henry, but for most of the medieval thinkers engaging in the topic. To see
how this becomes so problematic, we must now specifically narrow our focus of this
text to Boethius’ definition of person.
Boethius defines person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature.’29 His
definition is useful for the philosophers of the High Middle Ages because it employs
those philosophical groupings found in Aristotle’s Categories, in such a way that
Boethius’ ‘individual substance’ corresponds to Aristotle’s ‘primary substance’(ousia
prote), his ‘nature’ to the Aristotelian ‘physis’ and his use of ‘rational’ to the Greek
‘logon ekhon’.
According to Aristotle, a primary substance is that which is neither the predicate
of a substance nor inherent in a substrate but is a substrate itself. (Substrate, taken
from the Greek hypokeimenon and Latin subjectum, to mean ‘that which lies beneath’ or
‘subject of becoming’.) In other words, substrate refers to that of which a.) Universal
concepts are predicates, and b.) Accidental properties adhere in. Since the substrate is
not predicated of anything else and not inherent in anything else, it must be ‘in itself’.
The substance is primary, because it must be permanent, lasting, ‘underneath’, as
opposed to secondary qualities which do not exist ‘in themselves’, but rather, in the
substrate, yet are still constitutive of its essence. Hence, Boethius’ interpretation of
‘individual substance’. Boethius meant by ‘individual’ not indivisible, but undivided in
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itself. Thus, a primary substance must be first, a substrate, or subject, and must be
individual.
Boethius’ expression of a ‘rational nature’ within the definition of person implies
that the individual substance is clarified by the essence of possessing logos. Boethius
takes the notion of ‘nature’ from the Greek physis/phuo, meaning birth, and the Latin
nascor, natura, which means that which a living thing is by birth. The quality of being
‘rational’ refers to possessing logos (logon ekhon) as ratio, verbum, or oratio/sermo
(reason including discourse and literacy).
The problem, then, arises because, according to Aristotle, metaphysics applies to
all things. Boethius’ definition of person, then, must apply to divine persons, or the
person of Jesus Christ, as well as other human persons. His account, however, proves
problematic for reconciling a triune, yet monotheistic God- with three persons, as
father, son, and Holy Spirit. For one thing, what would it mean to say that the persons of
the trinity are separate substances? Or, that they are the same substance? God’s
nature, as triune, cannot be discussed in the same way the substance of a human being
can. Furthermore, attributing the quality of a ‘rational nature’ to God also proves
problematic.
Henry, of course, inherits these metaphysical traditions of interpretation which
developed from Boethius’ claims in De Trinitate. But, this is not the only tradition with
which he is familiar. For, Henry is also aware of the writings of Peter Abelard and John of
Salisbury, who grounded their own interpretations in Boethius’ logical works. Like those
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concerned with the metaphysical debate alone, Abelard and John of Salisbury share
various features which allow them to be investigated together for our purposes. In
addition to their references of the Porphyrian-Boethian notion of individuality as
unpredicability of many30, those who studied the logical works, also tend to reject the
cause of individuation as accidental and insist that it be extended to all entities, whether
substantial or accidental.
This tradition pays much closer attention to the semantic and linguistic issues
involved with the discussion of proper names and terms; an issue largely overlooked by
the others with purely theological, or metaphysical, concerns. Abelard’s own position, as
is examined by Gracia, is that individuals, unlike universals, are both things/objects and
words. In his logical works, moreover, he considers them primarily as words. Hence, the
semantic/linguistic concerns that seep into the High Middle Ages. However, Abelard
does not provide a theory concerning their ontological status. For this reason, Gracia
contrasts Abelard’s theory against those of an ‘Accidental Theory of Substantial
Individuation,’31 an ‘Essential’ one,32 and a ‘Formalist Theory with Criticisms,’33 stating
that Abelard’s own theory is a ‘Word View’ of individuation.
At this point, we hit that historical boundary that Gracia wrote of between the
Early Middle Ages and the shift in the High Middle Ages towards modernity. This is in no
way meant to be an exhaustive account of Boethius or the early medieval debate about
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individuation that he inspired. It is a significant point in our project though, because it
represents the bulk of the theories that Henry inherited, before contributing his own
thoughts to the historical/philosophical narrative of personhood. Though his discussion
also fits into the larger debate on universals, this study restricts itself primarily to
individuation as it applies to the concept and meaning of the term ‘person’ (persona). I
have drawn this restriction for several reasons, among them breadth of the subject and
texts yet to be published, but also, I think that Henry’s discussion of person in article 53
of his Summa, specifically, provides a philosophically significant insight into the
development and evolution of the larger conversation.
The crux of the problem, for Henry, is that Boethius did not distinguish clearly
between the epistemological issue concerning the cause (or principle) of discernibility of
individuals and the metaphysical one. Gracia states that only in the later Middle Ages do
we find a “consistent and prolonged attempt to deal with these two problems
separately, although the epistemic issue was never regarded as important as the
metaphysical one.” For, as he argues, “this is only to be expected of an age which had
no place for epistemology as a separate science.”34
In his De Trinitate, Richard of St. Victor offers a discussion of personhood which
attempts to resolve the problems found with Boethius’ definition. The result is a
meaning of the term which focuses on existence, as a distinct issue apart from essence.
In the fourth book of this text, after admitting the difficulty with considering a plurality
of persons in a unity of substance, Richard defines person as an ‘incommunicably proper
34
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existence of a spiritual nature’ (spiritualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia). He
rejects the connotations of the Greek hypostasis, pointing out that a word denoting
substance may signify a more generic or specific property, whereas the person signifies
‘an individual, singular, incommunicable property’. When considered with this
distinction, substance is understood to answer ‘what?’ by categorizing something with a
common property, whereas person answers ‘who?’ by giving a name (or its equivalent)
through a singular property. Because, when it comes to the divine persons, they share
one simple and indivisible being, God. Plurality of such personal properties must not
imply plurality of substance.
Here, Richard presents a division relevant to the definition of ‘person’ between
mode of being and mode of obtaining being. The former being one’s nature, or that
which he/she more generically or specifically possesses, the latter as obtention
(obtinentia) - the principle of one’s origin. This distinction allows him to distinguish
between angelic personhood, human personhood, and divine personhood. To have
divine personhood, then, is to be a person solely by obtention. To be an angelic person
is to be so purely by qualitative difference. And to have human personhood means to be
a person according to both modes simultaneously. Obtention, or the divine, becomes
the common existence or mode of being shared by all three. Because of the
incommunicable nature of the divine subsistence, one may speak of several personal
existences without compromising the unity of the substance (divine substance).
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Henry is not alone in his reading of Richard’s definition as providing a
philosophical correction to the one found in Boethius. But, he is alone in what he does
because of that acceptance. Henry no doubt appreciated Richard’s alterations because
they provide the basis for a relational definition of person, generally, and divine
persons, specifically.35 Taking up this project, he offers his own account of personhood,
one which shows a rather surprising (and some would say modern) awareness of
epistemic issues, arising from the metaphysical conversation at hand.

The Problem of Individuation
This dissertation, like the article it examines, is primarily concerned with Henry
of Ghent’s treatment of the divine persons. But the problem of individuation, though
not explicitly stated as such during the Early Middle Ages, is intricately linked to the
ideas of personhood and universals which are developed in the thirteenth century.
Because of this correlation, I refer to Jorge Gracia’s scholarship on individuation in the
Middle Ages as a point of reference. And so, a brief summation of his arguments may be
helpful for those unfamiliar with the historical progression of these ideas.36
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Gracia devoted two separate texts to the philosophical issue of individuation in
the Middle Ages. The first, Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, and the second
Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages until the Counter-Reformation. He
considers these time periods separately, in part due to the enormous span of time they
encompass, but primarily for the marked distinction between the treatment of
individuation before and after the thirteenth century. These thinkers share a common
textual foundation for their notion of individuation. As Gracia points out, this limited
textual foundation changes and increases enormously when, during the latter part of
the twelfth century, numerous translations from ancient and Islamic medieval works are
introduced to the West. This is precisely the time at which Henry is writing- as a
member of the Faculty of Arts at the University at Paris. This introduction of new ideas
and texts forces new accounts to be provided for old problems, especially those
metaphysical theories about the nature of being and the difference of individuation.
This transition can easily be seen in the High Middle Ages, when one considers the
breadth of attention paid to those topics in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, John Duns
Scotus and William of Ockham. (Gracia argues that the last of the authors to be
unaffected by the new texts and ideas are Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury, and that
these writings represent an historical boundary of sorts- where any study on the topics
must draw a line of distinction.)37
As Gracia acknowledges, the thirteenth century is the first place in Western
philosophical literature where the issues associated with individuality are considered for
37
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their own sake. Early medieval writers pay great attention, for instance, to the so-called
problem of universals. Yet there are no treatises, disputations, or chapters of books
devoted solely to the question of individuals. (p.255) His thesis is that they failed to
discuss the problem separately because they were too focused on the related issues of
solving the philosophical problem of universals and explaining the theological doctrine
of the Trinity.
The relevance of individuality to the context of the Trinity is quite obvious. Since
individuality was primarily understood by the early Medievals as distinction or numerical
difference, the dilemma of a triune God becomes one of logical consistency. If God is
one, then he must be indivisible, that is, individual. But that contradicts the triune
aspect of the formula, which grants divinity to three persons. If God is three, numerically
different, persons it contradicts the monotheistic aspect of the formula, which insists
upon one God. (p256)
This was Boethius’ main concern in De Trinitate. And it marks an indisputable
intersection between the notions of individuation and personhood. Gracia attributes
what little attention was paid to the problem of individuality to a philosophical maturity,
but also to some basic changes in the general outlook between the ancient and
medieval worlds. Namely, “the progressive and continuous growth of an appreciation
for the ontological status and value of the material world of sense perception, where
individuality is most evident.”38 In other words, the doctrine of a monotheistic, triune
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God gives individuality an importance which could not have arisen in ancient
philosophy.
To focus on the problem of individuation in the Middle Ages specifically, let us
follow Gracia’s division between the early authors and the Scholastics. Just as it is in
contemporary scholarship, in the Middle Ages there were two possible ways of
approaching the philosophical issue of individuality: as a metaphysical issue, or an
epistemic one. Most of the early authors, following Boethius and grappling with
Trinitarian theological concerns, restricted their focus to the metaphysical question of
individuation. These authors discuss the ontological status of the principle, but do not
exhibit semantic concerns with, for example, the function of proper names or indexicals.
(That being said, the epistemic approach does have medieval roots. Abelard, being the
most exemplary author, did present preliminary concerns with the logical and linguistic
issues related to individuality.)39
Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham are typically the primary thinkers to be considered
in discussion of this philosophical shift. They do provide a representative sample, sans
Henry, of what happened during that time. But it is not exhaustive and comparisons
with other thinkers, like Henry, helps us further refine the accuracy of the standard
model. Rather than a few dominant voices projecting change, the Universities of the
High Middle Ages were full of passionate and diverse voices that contributed to the
evolving conversation- Henry’s among them. Most of the thinkers of the time were
invested in reconciling Aristotle with the previously available texts, based in large part
39
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on Plato, Augustine, and Boethius. The ways in which they attempt to do that, however,
as well as the impact their attempts have had, varies greatly from writer to writer.
Henry is hesitant about the rush his colleagues made towards Aristotle, and in an
attempt to carefully and conservatively contribute to the ongoing dialogue around him,
he too seeks reconciliation.
Here, the discussion is almost entirely based on the textual tradition begun by
Boethius. This tradition contains Boethius’ Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, his
theological treatise De Trinitate, and to a lesser extent, his Commentaries on Aristotle’s
Categories and De Interpretatione. As Gracia reminds us, “Boethius’ texts, including the
key passages from Porphyry and Aristotle he translated, constitute the historical origin
and source of all subsequent discussions of individuation until the translations from
Arabic begin to appear…”40 For this reason, I shall limit my own contextual background
discussion to the writings of Boethius, rather than extending the tradition to include
Augustine and Plotinus as well.
Amongst those thinkers who have been concerned with the problem of
individuation, there is a shared metaphysical intuition about the place of objects in our
world. First, an individual thing/object is distinct from all other entities. (Even those
which are of the same specific kind) Second, they lose their fundamental character if
they are divided into parts. Third, individuals are one of a group class (or type) which has
or can have several members. Fourth, they remain the same through time and various

40

Gracia, 1984. p.13.

33

changes, and lastly, are not predicated of other things.41 The intuition may be
immediate and shared, but the implications of the possible conflicts are not. From a
philosophical perspective, if one is concerned with the claim that sameness or similarity
is basic to class/type, how does one also account for individual difference within the
class? Yet, if difference is taken, contrarily, to be fundamental in such instances, how
might one account for the similarity between class members? So too do problems arise
from the individual’s apparent inability to be divided, its enduring capacity across time
and change, or the epistemic nuances of distinction? These are all problems with
individuation, writ large, but when they were applied to the issue of person in the
Middle Ages, they took on a unique problematic structure- specifically since they were
applied to both human and divine persons. For, human persons are subject to the
corporeal implications of their existence, but divine persons have a different nature, if
nothing else, by virtue of being creator as opposed to created.
Whether metaphysical or epistemic, Gracia organizes the philosophical task of
accounting for individuation according to seven separate issues: the intention of
individuality, the extension of individuality, the ontological status of individuality, the
principle of individuation42, the discernibility of individuals, the function of proper
names and indexicals, and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.43
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42
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A. The Intention of Individuality
Being one of the few authors to address the topic, Boethius’ texts become the
bases for medieval notions of individuality. In his Commentary on the “Isagoge”
Boethius posits four different ways of understanding what is meant by individuality.
Something can properly be said to be individual if (1) it is indivisible into integral parts,
(2) it is indivisible into specific or generic parts, including things belonging to the same
species or genus, (3) it is not predicable of many, and (4) it has the quality of being nontransferable.
In the Commentary of Aristotle’s “Categories” he distinguishes between
individuality (as indivisibility) and particularity (as impredicability). In the Commentary
of Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione” (the second edition) he presents a metaphysical view
of individuality as incommunicability. And, as eluded to above, he treats the subject as
referring to numerical difference in De Trinitate. Gracia notes “Most early medievals
failed to see that individuality has to do primarily with non-instantiability or, as later
scholastics put it, incommunicability.”44
Hence, having inherited this tradition, we understand the assumptions Henry
makes about individual as an ‘individuum’ standing under a universal. And furthermore,
why he dismisses it as separate from his discussion of incommunicability. Yet we can
also see how he represents a shifting away from the established treatment by
concerning himself, not just with the intension of the term, but the extension as well.
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B. The Extension of Individuality
The extension of individuality concerns which type or category of things the term
refers. Early medieval authors can be described only either as moderate realists (or
alternatively moderate nominalists) or just as nominalists. There are no strong realists in
the thirteenth century, in the Platonic sense, who hold that nothing that exists is
individual. The sobering influence of Aristotle and the Christian ideas concerning the
persons and creation certainly seem to have had their effect in this period. (p263)
C. The Ontological Status of Individuality
This issue regards the metaphysical categorization of ‘individuation’ and only
becomes a point of interest in the later Middle Ages. ‘The problem we face with regard
to the issue of the ontological status of individuality is that there is just not enough
evidence on the basis of which to reach definite conclusions about what most early
medieval authors thought in this respect.’45
D. The Principle of Individuation
This is the aspect of the problem of individuality that concerned early, and for
that matter later as well, medieval authors the most. None of them used the terms
‘principle’ or ‘cause’, in discussions of this problem. This sort of terminology was
introduced only in the thirteenth century and became standard subsequently. …Instead
of asking about the ‘principle’ or the ‘cause’ of individuation, they asked about what
‘made’ things individual. Most early authors adhered to the view, developed from
45

Gracia, 1994. p.265.
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Porphyry through Boethius, that what makes an Aristotelian primary substance
individual and numerically different was the variety of accidents present in the
substance.
The issue can be presented as follows: If one interprets individuality primarily as
distinction from others, or as was called by many at the time, ‘difference’, it appears
quite obvious that the easiest way to account for such difference is to point to some
feature or features which set the individual apart from other individuals. What they
failed to see, however, was that individuality may not consist only, or even primarily, in
difference. Individuality above everything else seems to have to do with noninstantiability. ‘Difference, as later scholastics were going to see clearly, is more an
accompanying feature of individuality than its defining feature.’46
E. The Discernibility of Individuals
Unlike the Contemporary situation, where discernibility is often given
precedence in the subject, medieval authors did not regard the issue of individuality as
separate from discernibility. Their metaphysical approach left this matter largely
untouched.47
Like discernibility, the function of proper names and indexicals was not
addressed in the Middle Ages, except by those who adopted a purely
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Gracia, 1994. p. 270.
Ibid., pp.270-271.
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logical/grammatical approach. Abelard does distinguish between universals and what is
designated by proper names. But even his discussion is limited.
Yet, again, our analysis of article 53, question 1 exhibits some hint of just this sort of
concern shown by Henry. He is beginning to draw distinctions between the
grammatical/linguistic implications of the terms and the metaphysical necessities for
which they are said to relate.
F. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
The metaphysical formulation is as follows:
If x has the same characteristics as y, then x is identical with y. (Metaphysical principle of
identity)
If x and y are not identical, then x does have the same characteristics as y. (translated
into a more contemporary format.)
The epistemic formulation is as follows:
If x is indiscernible (or indistinguishable) from y, then x is identical with y. (epistemic
because it involves the epistemic notion of indiscernibility, of which identity is the
result.)
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If x is indiscernible (or indistinguishable) from y, then x is the same object as y (where
object is considered an epistemic entity, not a thing.) (modified for proper
proportion*)48
How medieval philosophers address these issues varies greatly between the
early and later authors of the period. As philosophical positions shift away from realism
and towards nominalism, we see a growing interest in the problem of individuation in its
own right. “Indeed, in the thirteenth century and later we find a slow but concerted
effort to distinguish individuality from numerical difference and to separate the logical
notion of a subject (impredicable) and predicate (predicable) from the metaphysical
notions of individual (incommunicable) and universal (communicable.)”49 By the close of
the twelfth century, the early medieval standard theory of individuation has all but
disappeared.
The reintroduction of Aristotle to the Latin West, coupled with
challenging theological demands, leads to a progressive discussion of the problem in the
thirteenth century. The Aristotelian tradition, as interpreted by those who adopted that
perspective, posits the aim of science in general and philosophy in particular as the
identification of causes and principles. As Gracia summarizes, “to know something
scientifically is to be able to identify the causes that brought it about and the principles
that play a role in its makeup. Thus, to know individuality is to be able to determine the
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causes and principles that are responsible for it.”50 This is what most scholastic authors
understood as the central issue concerning individuation.
As Gracia also argues, there are differences in the philosophical implications to
each aspect of the problem. The first, that of the intention of individuality, is a logical
one. (This has to do with the clarification of concepts, through the ability of
understanding and distinguishing.) The second, third, and fourth aspects are
metaphysical in nature, for they are concerned with the proper description of reality.
The fifth issue, however, is epistemic, as it considers the conditions for the possibility of
the discernment of individuals. Whereas, the sixth and final issue contained within this
problem is conceptual. We will see in the chapters to come that Henry takes each of
these six issues into account when providing his own philosophical treatment of the
divine persons.
When categorized into Gracia’s framework, one can easily see with which
aspects of the problem different philosophical traditions have been concerned. For
example, one might read the more modern, logical positivist movement as focused little
upon the metaphysical issues, but rather, as homing in on the epistemic, logical, and
linguistic aspects instead. While one might point to the traditional metaphysician as
having only addressed the second, third, and fourth dilemmas, while ignoring the
others. When reflecting upon the problem in the High Middle Ages, most scholars have
focused their attention to the treatment of the fourth issue- that of the cause or
principle of the phenomenon. Gracia states that this is because “up to the fourteenth
50
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century, one seldom finds a careful and clear distinction between these six issues and
much more effort is put into the solution of the fourth than into the solution of the
others.”51
The solution to the problem of individuation, in 13th century Scholasticism
specifically, depends to a great extent on (1) the interpretation of individuality, (2) the
things considered to be individual, and (3) the ontological status accorded to
individuality in the individual.
If individuality is interpreted as the relation of difference or distinction among
things, then the principle of individuation must consist in whatever makes individual
things different or distinct from one another. But, on the other hand, if individuality is
interpreted as indivisibility into units similar in nature to the original, then the principle
of individuation must be what accounts for such lack of division and not necessarily for
difference or distinction. If everything is individual, including the accidents of
Aristotelian primary substances, such as the hair color of a man or the weight of a cat,
the principles that go to make something individual would probably be different than if
the term ‘individual’ extended only to primary substances. Likewise, a difference arises
when physical and nonphysical entities are considered, as opposed to restricting the
extension to physical entities alone. (For example, matter could be a candidate in the
latter case, but would prove insufficient for the former.) And the reason for the third is
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that Ontological status matters because it is one thing to account for a real feature in a
thing and another to account for a concept in the mind. )52
As for Henry, we must ask- where does he fit into this historical tradition? He
most certainly inherited the tradition of Boethius via Abelard. But, teaching at the time
and place he did, he also represents those High Medieval thinkers who attempted to
reconcile the traditional stance on individuation with the newly reintroduced issues of
Aristotelianism. And so, his is a unique and interesting position in light of how he treats
the term ‘individuum’ in the first question of article 53 of his Summa.
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CHAPTER 3
HENRY’S TREATMENT OF RELATION
Aristotle began a discussion of metaphysics in ancient Greece roughly three
hundred years before the Common Era. In his philosophy he understood the notion of
relation as a categorical accident; an arbitrary attribute that is somehow tacked onto
the substance, but not an essential part of it. As a consequence of Aristotle’s analysis,
the notion of relation was not of great concern in his metaphysics because it was not
conceived of as having any real necessity for particular beings. Take, for example, the
statement that ‘Socrates is as white as Plato’. If the more Aristotelian notion of relation
were applied to this statement, then the fact that Socrates is ‘as white as’ Plato has
nothing to do with the substance of Socrates but is a merely accidental attribute. If, for
example, Socrates were to have been born lighter than Plato, his substance, namely
being a rational animal, would be no different.
Medieval theories of relation are less well known than ancient ones. What
happened in the medieval universities when Aristotle’s Metaphysics was re-introduced
to the Latin West? At this point thinkers in the Latin West became acutely aware of
Aristotle’s notion of relation and many thinkers in the Faculty of Arts quickly embraced
all of Aristotle’s ideas. But not every thinker simply accepted Aristotle’s analyses
without critique.
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Henry was regent master in the theology faculty in Paris from 1276 to his death
in 1293, and of course, much of his analysis of relation is driven by his religious
concerns, but one can and must distinguish the admittedly theological issues which
prompted Henry’s analyses from his theory of relation, which is decidedly philosophical
and surprisingly “modern.”
Metaphysics applies, according to Aristotle himself, to all beings. For Henry, a
Christian theologian in the Augustinian tradition, God is a triune being in unity, and
beings can be either created or uncreated, but according to Henry what Aristotle
maintains about relation does not adequately account for a triune God in unity and for
uncreated being. Consequently, Henry attempts to modify the Aristotelian
metaphysical notion of relation, and in turn, that modification becomes a catalyst for
the development of his own unique metaphysics; a metaphysics which would serve as a
“worthy alternative to Thomism”53 during his time and a significant contribution to the
ongoing philosophical conversation on esse for years to follow.
To provide a coherent discussion of Henry’s modification of the Aristotelian
conception of relation, this section will address (I.) Aristotle’s notion of relation, (II.) the
medieval context, (III.) the reasons Henry attempts to modify Aristotle’s notion of
relation, and (IV.) Henry’s own analysis of the term “relation”, especially where it
applies to the Trinity.
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Aristotelian Metaphysics
Aristotle deals with the notion of relation in three different books: The
Categories, The Metaphysics, and The Physics. As mentioned in the introduction,
Aristotle claimed that metaphysics should apply to all beings. A critical aspect of his
metaphysical system is his notion of the categorical accidents, tools used to classify
beings. These categories are coincidental attributes ‘inhering in’ a substance or esse, or
being, as foundation. These accidents, according to Aristotle, are distinct from the
substance of a thing, and are additional aspects of generation and corruption.
Because categorical relations are dependent upon other categories as their
foundation and because the relation of a thing does not necessarily determine the
nature of that thing, Aristotle places relation as the least of all extra-mental realities
(summa genera/ ens debilissimum). For example, if a person were to say that “Socrates
is more white than Plato”, what would that statement actually imply? Is the substance
of either Socrates or Plato necessarily impacted by the relationship “more white than”
which is outside of the mind? If Socrates gets a tan, Plato would then become whiter
than Socrates. However, the essence of neither would be changed and Plato, in this
example, has not changed at all. This obvious uncertainty is difficult in a system which
seeks universals, and one can understand the reason Aristotle may have wished to
subordinate the notion in some way. His hierarchical description of categories implies
that substantial being is more fundamental than qualitative or quantitative being and
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anything ‘accidental’. Thus, for Aristotle’s metaphysical structure, relation could never
work as a central point of importance.
In Metaphysics, Book V, c.15 , (a chapter Mark Henninger refers to as “a lexicon
of philosophical terms”), Aristotle lays out his highly nuanced threefold division of
relation as an accident. He divides the category of relation into 1) numerical relations of
identity (‘as white as’, ‘twice as much as’), 2) causal relations (‘cutting-cut’, ‘acting-acted
upon’), and 3) psychological relations (‘knowing subject-object known’, ‘measuremeasured thing’).
In the first case, that of identity, the basis of the relation is unity or plurality (as
pertaining to substance, quality, or quantity ) and is a numerical relation between two
extremes. Therefore, most medieval thinkers viewed this subdivision of relation as real
and mutual.
The second subdivision, causal relation, was also interpreted as real and mutual
because the two extremes belong to different categories but the same categorical ordo.
The basis for this case is active or passive potency.
The third category, the psychological, is perhaps the most complex. This relation
is unlike the first two types of relations, in that it is non-mutual and only real in one of
the two extremes, because the extremes belong to different categorical ordo. This
implies that, in this third case, dependency as a result of the relation may apply to only
one of the two extremes.
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In the Physics, Book V, ch.2, Aristotle maintains that there is no “motion in
respect of relation: for it may happen that when one correlative changes, the other,
although this does not itself change, is no longer applicable, so that in these cases the
motion is accidental.” For example, suppose that at t1 Socrates is taller than Plato.
Then at t2 Plato becomes as tall as Socrates. By t3, Plato is taller than Socrates. This
change in the relation between Socrates and Plato is not motion, but rather, the results
of generation and corruption. This claim is not surprising, considering Aristotle’s
ordering principle of kinesis, or motion. When Aristotle maintains that there can be ‘no
motion in respect to relation’, this caused no problem with his theory of an Unmoved
Mover because motion requires contraries existing on a scale within one single
immovable being.
In the Categories, ch.7, Aristotle distinguishes relation from the other categories,
chiefly substance, quality, and quantity. It is important to keep in mind here that his
agenda is to characterize relations on a semantic/logical level . He seems to maintain
that no substance can ever be relative. (“Those things are called relative, which, being
either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by
reference to that other thing.” ) Aristotle goes on to provide two additional definitions.
The first is that “those things only are properly called relative in case of which relation
to an external object is a necessary condition of existence” and the second is that “we
call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of
existence.”
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This may seem to be a puzzling understanding of relation to the modern reader,
because the term has developed into being thought of as residing between two
substances. However, for Aristotle (as well as medieval thinkers), the accidental
category is understood to be an item that inheres within a particular given substance as
an extra-mental reality (opposed to a relation of reason). Medieval philosophers seem
to share this understanding in a strict way. For every distinct substance, there must be a
distinct set of accidents. For Aristotle, this is being-towards-something (ta pros ti; Latin
equivalent, esse ad aliquid, or accidental being).
Aristotle’s logical definition of relation is in reference to another thing, the “ad
aliquid”. This implies that it may contain contraries (virtue and vice), variation of degree
(like and unlike), and simultaneous correlatives. His ontological definition implies that
relation is a necessary condition of existence.
Although Aristotle’s notion of relation may seem complex, it is simple in
comparison to the discussion concerning relation that would follow him in the High
Middle Ages. In proportion to the subjects of his writing, Aristotle devotes very little
space to relation. But, he devotes enough to ignite a spark. That spark was reintroduced to the thinkers of the Latin West at a very interesting time.

The Need for Modification
The discussion of the medieval conversation of relatio, relation, requires context.
Thinkers in the Middle Ages understood Aristotle in a certain way, through the lens of
interpretation. That interpretation must be understood before one can fully grasp the
48

authority it was given. Added to that is the environment in which this interpretation
was being analyzed. These thinkers were not only interpreting Aristotle; they were
interpreting him in the context of a culture on the brink of enormous change.
During the 12th and 13th centuries, Christian theologians were struggling with the
arrival of Aristotelian philosophy, which had been reintroduced to the Latin West by
Muslim scholars.54 At this point, two major events were happening in the West. On one
hand, the rise of the Catholic Church was calling for a solidification of Christian doctrine
including an accepted understanding of a monotheistic, yet triune, God. On the other
hand, the rise of the universities produced scholars who were calling for a more
thorough study of secular philosophical texts to supplement the previously studied texts
of the Bible and Peter Lombard’s books on the Sentences55.
So, for Henry of Ghent, a secular master of theology teaching at the university in
Paris from around 1276 to 1293 (and writing theology for the Catholic Church)56, the
challenge became to “…address in a manner congenial to reason and revelation the
non-Christian philosophy, particularly Aristotle and his commentators.”57 This task,
although complex, is representative of a shift taking place in religious and philosophic
scholasticism. Henry, along with his contemporaries, could have ignored the
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Medieval philosophers, when mentioning Aristotle, often refer to ‘the Philosopher and his
Commentator.’ Generally, the Commentator referred to is Averroes. (Boethius also wrote commentaries
on Aristotle; there were also Greek commentaries on his works; and Grosseteste and other anonymous
commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics also circulated in the Middle Ages.)
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Lombard’s book on the Sentences became the main teaching text for Theology.
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Henry of Ghent (appointed by the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier) sat on the commission for the
Condemnation of 1277 (March 7th), in which the bishop of Paris condemned two hundred and twenty
philosophical positions.
57
J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, p.2.
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Aristotelian writings and structured a metaphysics that would fit neatly into the spiritual
status quo, rather than trying to account for both. Instead, the philosophical
conversation attempted reconciliation.
Aristotle’s notion of relation seemed inadequate for medieval thinkers committed to
certain religious beliefs. Specifically, there were difficulties with (1) Aristotle’s belief
that relation was an accident, (2) the fact that Aristotle’s account of relation seemed to
deny any special providence by God, and (3) Aristotle’s unmoved mover was
necessitarian. It was not a free Creator.58
(1) Henry felt that Aristotle’s notion of relation was inadequate in accounting for
uncreated beings because in Aristotle’s system relation is an ‘accident.’ As a
metaphysical category, relation must apply to all beings (both created and uncreated).
As an accident, relation implies contingency. For a Christian theologian like Henry, there
is obviously a relational aspect to the Trinity (God the Father and God the Son).59 But
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Divine simplicity is part of a well-established tradition in the Middle Ages. An issue for Christian, Jewish,
and Islamic thinkers alike, it has ancient roots. When the Platonic notion of divine transcendence was
inherited alongside the Aristotelian notion of God as a fully actualized intellect, the result was a Medieval
conception of the divine as pure and unlimited being. For thinkers like Avicenna and Maimonides this
purity implied an absolute unity which excludes the possibility of internal divisions. When Avicenna states
“It is not possible that the true nature whose existence is necessary be composed of a multitude at all…”
(Avicenna 1973) he is referring to the divine as the only essence that is necessarily one with existence and
can have nothing superadded to it. Maimonides, in a similar manner, conceives of God as a subject about
whom we can predicate nothing. “He, may he be exalted, is one in all respects; no multiplicity should be
posited in Him…” (Maimonides 1963) Predication imposes limitation upon a subject, by implying that the
subject is one thing or another, and thus cannot be properly applied to God. The divine, then, necessarily
lacks accidents/attributes. (Pessin 2016)
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“According to Christian doctrine of the Trinity, God exists in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
As this doctrine was typically understood during the Middle Ages, it implied not only that God possesses
certain relations—such as fatherhood and sonship—but also that he possess them independently of the
activity of any mind. As Aquinas says in his Summa Theologiae: Someone is said to be a father only by
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the relations “son of” and “father of” are not accidents for the Christian Trinitarian. The
Trinity cannot contain contingency, as this would be to imply an imperfection in God
which is unworthy of him60.
The medieval doctrine of divine simplicity argues for the understanding that any
relation between God and his intrinsic or essential attributes would need to be
necessary and not contingent, because there is no real distinction to be drawn between
God and any of his intrinsic or essential attributes. God is simple. God’s attributes
should not be understood as a pie-chart, having compartmentalized aspects. Augustine
points out in book V of his De Trinitate that there arises a special difficulty for those who
want to combine this understanding with the Christian doctrine of creation. For this
doctrine would seem to require that God first lacks, and then acquires a contingent or
accidental relation—namely, that of being creator.61
If relatio (relation) implies contingency and imperfection is an accident, and if one
believes in an uncreated being outside of the realm of accidents which has an essential
relation built into it (a triune God), then how can a metaphysics be structured? Henry’s
solution to this question aims at the ‘accidental’ part of Aristotle’s theory. Although this
is an important problem Henry needed to address, it is not the only one.

virtue of his fatherhood, and someone is said to be a son only by virtue of his sonship. Therefore, if [the
relations of] fatherhood and sonship are not really in God, it follows that God is not a Father or Son really,
but merely according to a concept of the mind- which is the Sabellian heresy.” Stanford Encyclopedia.edu.
60
HENRY OF GHENT, Summa, art.32, q.5: “Sed hoc ignobilitatis est, et tale, ut habitum est supra, maxime Deo
repugnant. Ergo etc.”
61
Translations of Augustine have been taken from two sources: M.T. CLARK. "De Trinitate." The Cambridge
Companion to Augustine, and A. W. HADDAN. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.
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(2) If Aristotle is correct, God’s special providence is also questionable, if not
impossible. Aristotle believed that beings are substances. According to his own notion
of relation (aside from the consequences of an accidental attribute), the primary
substance could not be related to this world at all, because this would expose the
primary substance to generation and corruption. If applied to the Christian God, that
would imply that God, the primary being, could have no knowledge of the lives of his
creatures and God’s providence could not be accounted for. Furthermore, God would
not be able to intervene in the affairs of this world.
This would eliminate the ability for miracles and personal relationships with the
divine. Henry would not have been comfortable with this, because he saw the nature of
God as a twofold self-recognition through divine intelligence (thought) and divine will
(love), which implies awareness. The Christian God is not only aware of the lives of his
creatures, but also engaged with them through prayer and sacrifice. In fact, according
to Henry, the existence of creatures depends on an exemplar, or idea, in the mind of
God. For Henry, humans are reflections of God, and thus, are very much related in that
regard.
(3) This develops into another problem which Henry finds in Aristotle’s notion of
relation: the problem of God’s creation as necessary. (This is a different concern than in
the first problem, which was a Trinitarian concern.) This is a problem Henry found in not
only Aristotle, but also Latin Averroism.62 Henry maintains 1) the Trinity is a triune, yet
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Unlike Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Datia, Henry was hesitant of the quick acceptance of Latin
Averroism by his colleagues, especially on the point of necessity. The idea that creation implied necessity
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monotheistic, divinity that is not capable of containing contingent attributes, yet
encompasses real relations between three distinct persons, and 2) creation is the
spiritual action of a knowing and loving God who is aware of his creatures without being
essentially changed by them (as addressed in the previous paragraph). These create a
need in his thought for further distinctions of real relations that will allow for a
difference applied to each extreme63 involved in the relation.
Basically, Henry needs creatures to be reflections of and thus dependent upon God,
but he needs God to be independent from the contingency of his creatures. God cannot
be altered by the act of creation. Nor does Henry believe that creatures are necessary
beings; God, and even God as creator, is not dependent on creatures. According to
Aristotle, two extremes or relata are needed to establish a relation. So, to claim that “a
is related to b” (aRb) where “a” and “b” are the terms or extremes that establish a
relationship “R”, the relation needs both extremes. If “Socrates is the father of Plato”,
the relation “is father of” needs both terms or extremes; i.e. both Socrates and Plato.
But, to claim that “God is the creator of humans”, Henry wants to avoid claiming that
the relation “is creator of” requires humans. For Henry, God is completely free in
creating humans.

to God was condemned not only in 1277, but also earlier, in 1270. In the earlier condemnation, also
carried out by Tempier, thirteen averroistic propositions were considered to be erroneous; including the
proposition that God does not know individual things, there never was a first man, and human affairs are
not regulated by the Providence of God. The Condemnation of 1277 furthered the attacks on Latin
Averroism: proposition #22. that God cannot be the cause of a newly made thing and cannot produce
anything new; #28. that from one first agent there cannot proceed a multiplicity of effects, #20. that God
of necessity makes whatever comes immediately from Him. (HYMAN & WALSH, Philosophy in the Middle
Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, pp.584-591).
63
Note that ‘extreme’ refers to the distinguished terms. Here the extremes are God and his created
beings.
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Henry’s theological concerns do not fit into the systematic approach of Aristotle as
is. When addressing Henry’s criticism of Aristotle and Averroes, Flores points out that to
Henry, “these thinkers ground their conclusions in their observation of nature.
Accordingly, they envision generation solely in terms of natural change and the will
solely as a principle of acting and making. Thus, they failed to see how there can be a
communication of nature by intellect and will.”64 Thus, a modification is needed.

Henry’s Discussion of Relation
How does Henry suggest we should think about the notion of relation, if it is
different from Aristotle’s notion? According to available scholarly editions, Henry first
addresses the notion of relation in Quodlibet III, question 4, in the year 127865. (Notice
that this is one year after he participated in the Condemnation of 1277. Henry has just
spent a considerable amount of time engaged in Aristotle’s writings, and has certainly
devoted time to finding limits with reference to theology in his thought.)
In this question Henry discusses Avicenna’s argument that different modes of
being can be combined, so that substantial being could be combined with relational
being and accidental being. Because relation becomes so important in his system,
Henry deals with it in many different places. The primary discussion of relation seems
to be in his Summa, article 32, question 5, c.1279-80.66 However, aspects can also be
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seen throughout his Quodlibeta67. However, before discussing that particular text, an
examination of Henry’s overall metaphysics is needed. Henry’s analysis of relation is
articulated through a web of very technical terms, each of which will be addressed
separately below. Considering this discussion, the problems examined in section III
(Henry’s problems with the Aristotelian notion) will be revisited.
As mentioned previously, Henry modifies Aristotle’s notion of relation, making
relation a central aspect of his thought. His notion of relation resides within a very
complex understanding of esse. Henry uses five terms when discussing relation. These
are: (1) res (‘thing’), (2) fundamentum (‘base’), (3) modus (‘mode’), (4) respectus
(‘respect’), and (5) ratio (‘notion’). Each of these five terms have very technical
meanings and each must be understood.
1. Res
In the process of constructing a metaphysical system, Henry begins by thinking of
reality in the very broadest sense possible. Res, or thing, is this starting point for
Henry68. Res is the most fundamental metaphysical category that contains all others69.
The broadest sense of res is only opposed to that which is pure nothing (purum nihil).
From this fundamental category of res/thing there are three subcategories, having a
common center.
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S. P. MARRONE, Truth and Scientific Knowledge. pp.108-110.
69
Henry draws out his ideas on the categories in Summa, art.32, q.5; Quod. V, q.2; Quod.VII, q.1-2.
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The first, broadest field is the category itself: that which could have being (ens) and
that which could not have being (non ens). Henry refers to this category as ‘res a reor
reris’ because of his assumption that the term derived etymologically from reor, reris “to
think.” In Quodlibet VII, questions 1 and 2, Henry gives the example of a “golden
mountain”70. One could conceptualize of a golden mountain, because one has
experienced gold and one has experienced mountains, even though those concepts
would never join as an actualized being. (Aristotle’s example of this same issue
concerns a “goat-stag.”71) This category is esse as an imaginary concept.
The second, more restricted field than the first, consists of ‘things’ that could have
actual existence in the world. Henry refers to this category as ‘res a ratitudine’.
Ratitudine etymologically refers to ratitudo, “rational thought.” The being of this
category either possesses or relates to an exemplar in the mind of God, which is the
origin of all creation. This category is esse as essence.
The third, most restricted field of the three consists only of those things which do
have actual existence in the world. This category is referred to as ‘res existens in actu’.
‘Res existens in actu’, then, is esse as existence.72 The ‘res’ of this category includes all
the unique characteristics and accidents of the individuated being.
Take for example the statement ‘Socrates is the father of Plato.’ Henry believes
the res of this statement to be the actual existing beings of Socrates and Plato as
70
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individuals (including all the qualities and quantities that make them distinctly
themselves). It is the idea of ‘this man’ and ‘this man’ directly.
2. Fundamentum
At this point, Henry has distinguished between essence (essentia) and existence
(existens). Henry’s next task of modification is to address the issue of foundation, or
base (fundamentum). This is a very important yet very complicated issue for his
metaphysics.
The fundament is understood by Henry as the qualities or quantities upon which
any particular relation is founded; so that something may be white (an accident, namely,
a quality) and in addition, it may be similar to another white thing (a relation). In the
statement ‘Socrates is as white as Plato’, the ‘as white as’ is the relation. But, if there
are no white things except for Socrates, then, for Henry, the fundament, i.e. white, still
exists even though the relation ‘as white as’ does not. (This is a point on which Scotus
heavily criticizes Henry.73)
3. Modus
The concepts of ‘thing’ and ‘foundation’ lead into Henry’s use of mode (modus)
which concerns actual existence. Instead of asking whether the diverse res of different
categories can be transferred to God, Henry asks whether the “modes” of being of the
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See J. Decortes’ article, Modus or Res: Scotus’ Criticism of Henry of Ghent’s Conception of the Reality of
a Real Relation for a further discussion of Scotus’ criticism.
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different categories can be attributed to God.74 Thus, mode of being becomes a crucial
tenet within the metaphysics of Henry’s thought. In fact, in his book on Relations, Mark
Henninger entitles his chapter about Henry: ‘Relation as Mode of Being.’75
Henry’s emphasis upon modal distinction cannot be overstated. J. Decorte
demonstrates this significance in the conclusion of his article on Henry’s metaphysical
notions of relation and substance by saying that “since all creation is dependent upon a
Creator, and since that Creator is a tri-unity, all creation and the Creator are in an
eminent way relational. Relatedness is a mode of being of all that is; indeed, it is the
primary mode of being of all that is. Hence, no metaphysics can do without relation.”76
One is reminded of Hegel, who claimed that one cannot define being without the notion
of relation.
In the statement “God is the creator of Plato”, the phrase “is creator of” is really
expressing a mode of being. With a mode of being, relata or the extremes (in this case,
God and Plato) are not both needed to establish the relation “is creator of” because in
this example, Plato is not required for God to be a creator. God, in Henry’s thought, is
not dependent on creatures. Mode may be best understood when discussed along with
respect (respectus).
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4. Respectus
Juan Carlos Flores describes Henry’s notion of respect by contrasting it with that of
relation:
“…even though both relation and respect signify ‘being toward another’ (ad
aliud esse), the relative name (relation) ‘father’ can be predicated of that to
which it is related, while the respective name (respectus) ‘paternity’ cannot
be predicated of that to which it is related. A father is the father of the son,
but his paternity is not the paternity of the filiation. Thus, respectus signifies,
strictly speaking, relatedness toward something, regardless of whether the
name bespeaks the foundation as well (as some names of respectus do).
Only if the respectus is also a name of the foundation related as well as of its
relatedness can the respectus be called relatio.”77

In this example ‘paternity’ is the respectus, which is different from the relation ‘is
father of…’ To illustrate this further, one can carry this example out and apply it to a
situation of multiple siblings. The relation “is father of” establishes the “respectus” with
the first child, but once established by the first child, subsequent children do not add
additional “respects”. And furthermore, should any of the multiple children pass out of
actual existence, the “respectus” would remain unaltered.
In his discussion of this same subject matter, Jos Decorte claims that “Using the
name relatio in a proper sense, however, we can no longer say that both (relatio and
respectus) can be used interchangeably: for although every relatio is a respectus, not
every respectus is a relatio.”78 With regards to the above distinction between ‘paternity’
and ‘fatherhood’, Decorte cites Henry’s Summa, article 35: “Whereas ‘father’ is both
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relatio and respectus, ‘fatherhood’ is respectus and, strictly speaking, not relatio.”79
Returning to the example given above about Socrates and Plato, ‘Socrates is the father
of Plato’ the respectus of Socrates would be his paternity-ness and the respectus of
Plato would be his filiation-ness.
5. Ratio
The mode of existing of participated being80 is considered the ratio (notional
concept81, essential concept, definition). As opposed to res, which is the material
principle of each category of reality, ratio is the formal principle of each category. The
mode of existing of the divine is found as the self-act of knowing and loving; this is God’s
ratio, or notional concept. But existing created beings also have a ratio. So that, if
‘Socrates is the father of Plato’, the ratio, for Henry, would be the concept of Socrates
and the concept of Plato.
These five notions are critical to place Henry’s notion of relation within a coherent
context. As has been demonstrated, his notion of relation is not an isolated one, but is a
notion working in conjunction with his other metaphysical notions so that his system
can solve the problems needed to be addressed by him.
IVb. Resolving Problems from Section III
In light of understanding Henry’s system, let us now revisit the three problems
mentioned earlier that Henry found within Aristotle’s notion of relation.
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(1.) Relation as an accident By building his metaphysics in such a way that relation
becomes essential to being, rather than accidental, Henry’s notion of relation can
handle the problem which his Trinitarian beliefs posed for Aristotle’s analysis of relation.
If relation is within being rather than tacked onto it as an accident, the relation of father
and son within the Trinity does not imply any accidental attribute tacked onto God.
According to Henry, the Father generates first in the mode of intellect and is thus
un-generated, while the Son proceeds as the Word of the intellect and the Holy Spirit as
Love out of the will.82 Consequently, through this conversation between the divine
intellect and the divine will, God is aware of himself as thought (through the Son) and
loving that knowledge (through the Holy Spirit). But, because these persons are still
within the one God, they are distinct, not separate. Thus, by creatively uniting the two
most common methods for understanding the Trinity into a form of self-reflection,
Henry establishes a Trinity of eternal spiritual action.
(2.) Divine Providence: In Henry’s system God can have knowledge of particulars and
have guidance over his creation without being corrupted because of the relational
distinctions Henry has built into his system. Because God has a different mode of being,
ratio, and respectus than created beings have- the relation has different implications
depending on which direction it is pointing towards. Consequently, the creator and a
created being may participate in a shared relationship, but one could understand the
relationship as philosophically implying one thing for the creator and another thing for
the created being. The one relation can have different implications for each extreme in
82
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the relation. This understanding allows one to conceive of a difference in necessity
between the extremes of the creator/created relation: where God may be able to
influence beings that are in space and time without being exposed to space and time
Himself.
(3.) God’s creation as necessary: Henry believes his notion has solved this problem
because God exists in the mode of being as creator, whether created beings are existing
in actuality or not. (See Modus in Section IVa) An example of Henry’s philosophical
concern is that the Aristotelian notion of relation, as Henry understood it, entailed that
the statement ‘God is creator of Plato’ implies contingency to both extremes (God and
Plato) participating in the relation (‘is creator of’).
By removing relation from the accidental category and applying the five aspects
discussed in section IVa, the statement ‘God is creator of Plato’ may be understood
differently. Within Henry’s system, Plato (as an existing being) depends upon the
relation. Plato must have this established relationship with God in order to ‘be created’.
However, God, as ‘creator of’, does not depend upon the established relationship with
Plato. God is creator whether or not this particular relation is established.
Henry’s notion of relation is discussed here, because it demonstrates a metaphysical
approach to the subject of the divine. This will later be contrasted with the approach
that Henry takes to the notion of person in question 1 of article 53, which is decidedly
epistemic. When considering the notion of relation, we see that Henry addressed the
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nature of God through the lens of essence and accident.83 And although the subject
matter of divine relation and the divine persons are inextricably linked, he treats the
latter very differently. There, when discussing the divine persons, Henry considers the
language we use to convey the meaning of persons and whether that meaning forms
the proper concept in our minds for thinking about the divine. Henry’s comparison of
specific terms, we will see, is different in each account. In the above section of relation,
we see him comparing terms to build a metaphysical account of God’s triune nature. In
question 1 of article 53, we will again see his consideration of specific terms, yet there,
he contrasts them with the notion of person to demonstrate their fallibility in conveying
the unique meaning which only the term ‘persona’ is able to convey. But before moving
on to that discussion, let us consider the philosophical connections established thus far.
I have now demonstrated the ways in which substance and relation took on new
importance for philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages. It was suggested by
Saint Basil that an understanding of the Trinity lay more in understanding the types of
relation existing between the three members of the Godhead than in the nature of the
Persons themselves. But in fact, for Henry, the two concepts are philosophically linked.84
This is because, according to Christian doctrine, the persons of the trinity exist in
relation to each other as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. So, Henry maintains
83
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that the divine persons are relations, essentially. And like the problem of universals, the
philosophical question for the Scholastics was whether relations were real or only
mental.
Henry treats relation as a real feature of the divine. (Albeit introducing distinctions
between the reality of the being and our understanding of it.) We should expect, then,
that Henry will offer his own solution pertaining to personhood. As we will see, what
separates the divine persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit while maintaining the
divine unity of the Godhead, Henry argues, is a triune nature of incommunicability. The
Father is a person in relationship with himself as Father to the Son and distinct from the
Son by virtue of an incommunicability. Incommunicability, an essence of unutterable
being, suggests a relation of communication. Some aspect of the Father’s nature is
incommunicable to the Son, and vice versa. They are whole as one relation. They are
distinct as the persons in the relationship. Thus, one might assume Henry would treat
both relation and personhood with similar ontological status. We will see that he does.
A through accounting of his framework should provide insight into the following
questions: Are universals and relations real, or mental/verbal constructs? Does the term
‘person’ signify something real, or something in the mind alone? And, how do each of
these terms refer to created and uncreated beings? We will revisit these questions after
the exegesis and analysis of Article 53, question 1.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EXEGESIS OF SUMMA, ARTICLE 53, QUESTION 1
Article 53 of Henry’s Summa contains the secular master’s teachings ‘On Those
Things That Pertain to the Distinction of the Persons’. Henry opens this section with a
reflection on the articles before it and offers his reader an explanation of why he
organizes the following discussion in the manner which he does.
“Since thus far we have dealt with those things that in God pertain to the
common substance, there remains that we thereafter deal with those
attributes that pertain to the distinction of the persons. And we must do this
first with those that pertain to those that are proper and secondly with those
that pertain to those that are appropriated. And with regard to those that
are proper we must first deal with those that pertain to the individual
persons by themselves and secondly with those that belong to them in
relation to one another. And with regard to those that belong to the
individual persons by themselves, we must first deal with them in general,
but secondly in particular. And in general, we must first deal with the
persons, secondly with the properties of the persons that are commonly
called notions.”85
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“Praetractato hucusque de his quae in Deo pertinent ad communem substantium, deinceps restat
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With regard to divine persons, Henry maintains, two overarching questions need
to be asked. First, he insists that one must formulate an answer concerning the manner
of being (of the persons) in God. And only after that should one progress to a solution
concerning the manner of the one person’s emanating from another.
To the first, he addresses ten questions concerning personhood/ the divine
persons. Henry first asks (1) whether it is necessary to hold that there is a person in God.
He goes on to inquire (2) whether, in God, ‘person’ has being in a proper or transferred
sense, (3) whether ‘person’ has being in God and in creatures univocally and with the
same character, (4) whether ‘person’ has being according to substance or to relation,
and (5) whether in God, ‘person’ signifies a thing or an intention. He then asks (6)
whether an absolute supposite has being in God and (7) whether ‘person’ signifies
something common in God. After inquiring about (8) whether or not many persons must
be held to be in God, Henry asks (9) whether there are only two persons in God or some
other number. And, finally, he responds to the question of (10) whether, in God, one
person is in another mutually or in the same way.
One can understand, given the traditional problems of individuation he has
inherited, why he frames the discussion in these terms, and specifically in this order. To
distinguish between persons in the divine, he draws his focus to the metaphysical
nature of the divine persons. My interest begins with his first question, for it is here that
Henry lays out his own unique account of personhood, in terms of eight specific
components, and it is this categorization, when taken in context with the larger
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treatment contained in this article, that exhibits Henry’s original epistemic
considerations.
Question 1 of article 53 contains Henry’s response to ‘Whether it is necessary to
hold that there is a person in God’. (Utrum Sit Ponere Personam Esse In Deo.) In
standard scholastic format, he begins with possible objections to, or reasons for
rejecting, the notion of divine persons. He references Boethius’ definition, and the
problematic implications of focusing on a ‘rational nature’ and ‘individual substance.’86
Henry maintains that the divine has an intellectual nature rather than a rational one.
Furthermore, one cannot describe God as an individual substance, since that implies a
universal capable of being individuated, which is not the case with God. (See discussion
above.)
His second objection derives from the writings of Augustine in book five of On
The Trinity. There, the nature of divine persons is explained as something said for mere
convenience of thought. That is, person was employed as a way to talk about the divine
rather than remaining silent. But critics suggested that had little to do with the divine
nature itself, and merely demonstrated some fact about human limitations.87 This, of
course, will not suffice since Henry wants to maintain the divine persons as necessary
due to the divine nature, not just convenience of conversation. So, he offers Richard of
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St. Victor as a contrary, and more appropriate, viewpoint because it accounts for the
incommunicable nature of the divine and allows for a unity of substance despite that
plurality of personhood.88 Henry compares the incommunicable nature of the divine
persons to the property of generation between the Father and Son. Later he will argue
that the property of the Father, by which he communicates his essence to the son, is
also incommunicable.89
In the process of introducing these objections, Henry has presented three
possible meanings for the term ‘person.’
Definition 1 (From Boethius): A person is an individual substance of a rational nature.
‘persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.’90
Definition 2 (From Augustine): A person is that which is said so as not to remain silent.
‘Dictum est tres personae, non ut illud diceretur sed ne omnino taceretur.’91
Definition 3 (From Richard of St. Victor): A person is an existence found to have
something one and incommunicable.
‘Existentia divina si vel unum aliquid invenitur habere incommunicabile, ex eo
solo depraehenditur atque convincitur esse persona.’92
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Solutio (The Resolution of the Question)
Henry resolves that one must hold ‘absolutely and without qualification’ that
there is a person in God, after determining that one must attribute to God only that
which is ‘without qualification more worthy and better to be than not to be’. This point
is attributed to On the Faith by Ambrose, and Henry maintains that it applies to the
divine personal and essential qualities alike.93
De Significatione Octo Terminorum (On the Meaning of the Eight Terms)
It is at this point that Henry provides his own account ‘On the Meaning of the
Eight Terms’. The terms are “individual,” “this something,” “singular,” “natural thing,”
“subsistence,” “substance,” “supposite,” and “person.” These names, as he calls them,
constitute his theory of personhood. According to Henry they ‘represent and signify
almost the same thing with regard to the nature and essence of a natural thing, when
nature is taken in a very broad sense.’94 An example of this arises when describing a
human person. His task, then, is to determine whether they behave similarly when
applied to the divine persons. Do all eight terms, when applied to the divine nature,
represent and signify the same thing? Let us remember Henry’s inquiry into the notion
of relation, where he invokes Aristotle’s determination that metaphysical statements
must apply to all beings. A similar point is in play here. Henry cites a claim made by
Boethius in On the Two Natures, that “If one wants to say ‘nature’ of all natural things,
93
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such a definition will be given that can include all the things that exist…that, since they
exist, can somehow be grasped by the intellect.”95 As we will see, Henry argues that the
eight terms do not, in fact, apply equally to the divine persons as they do with other
natural things. He considers them now, one by one, in this framework.

Individuum
The definition of a nature must define substances and those accidents applied to
them. While the first two terms (“individual” and “this something”) are found in the
essence of a creature in both substance and accidents, they are not applicable to the
uncreated essence or God. Again, Henry discussed the problem with individuation. Since
“individual” has its contrary “non-individual” it becomes problematic when attributed to
God, because these terms imply a universal. An individual (in character or intention), as
he understands it, is only something really particular or singular if individuated under
something really universal.96 But God is not an individual under a universal.
Because, in God, ‘it is not possible in accord with what has been determined to
find the character of a real universal or particular,’ it would not be possible to find the
character of an individual except by extending the name ‘individual’ to the character of
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the singular.’97 This is why, Henry claims, the Decretals refer to the Holy Trinity as
“individual according to the common essence, but separate in accord with the personal
properties.”98 Henry extends the use of ‘separate’ to imply ‘distinct.’99 While
separation is not found in the divine, distinction is. For this reason, Henry distinguishes
between essence and natural thing/individual. ‘So that,’ he suggests, ‘a natural thing is
properly said to be an individual, but a nature is said to be the essence of a thing
whether in itself or as individuated in a supposite.’100
Because Henry’s notion of individuation is so closely related to his notion of
personhood, I treat it in further detail as a preface to section 8 on the term ‘person.’ For
the sake of practicality, however, let us understand ‘individual’ as generally referring to
an individual entity or instance as distinguished from a group of other entities/instances.

Hoc Aliquid
At first glance, the terms ‘individual’ and ‘this something’ may appear to have
the same linguistic function and meaning. In other words, they seem to name/point to
the same entities in the world and in our minds. Henry demonstrates, however, that this
is not the case. He draws a distinction between the two, stating that while both terms
do point to the same thing in reality (the utterance of ‘individual’ and ‘this something’
both designate the same object in the world), they differ from one another in meaning
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and signify differently or point to different concepts/notions in the mind- in relation to
the object in the world.
Each term has in common the idea of some part, understood as standing under
some whole which is divided by negation. They differ in how they accomplish this. The
term ‘individual’ is said in order to signify the character of an entity which is unable to
be divided further into parts while remaining a coherent whole. It expresses negation by
denying divisibility. The words ‘this something’ is said in order to express the same
signification. But, where ‘individual’ merely expresses that denial, or negation, of
divisibility, ‘this something’ conveys that meaning (the denial, or negation, of divisibility)
and more. As Henry states it, “this something…adds the character of negation in relation
to a part divided with it. For when ‘this’ is said, a thing is understood to be something
individual…But when ‘something’ is added, there is expressed that it is made something
other from which it is divided.”101
The meaning that is expressed by the use, or utterance, of ‘individual’ is
accomplished also by the use, or utterance, of the term ‘this’ alone. (In other words,
‘this something’ is understood as an ‘individual something.’) But the addition of the
word ‘something’ changes and adds to the meaning of the expression. So, the important
difference between the two names ‘individual’ and ‘this something’ hinges upon the
second term of the latter name. Namely, ‘something.’ Or, put differently, the word ‘this’
101
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(referring to the character of this-ness) acts as ‘individual’ does to refer to the character
of individuality. When ‘this’ is said, a thing or nature is understood to be something
undivided or individual in itself because of the designation of a thing that can be seen by
the eyes. (i.e., the entity in reality). The word ‘something’ does not. ‘Something’ then
adds to this-ness/individuality an added nuance between nature, essence, and
supposite. When ‘something’ is added, the expression means to make the entity
designated by the ‘this’ something other than merely an individual. The otherness also
expresses a distinct essence and nature. At this point, Henry has laid out the difference
between the first and second terms. He then goes on to discuss how, like individual, the
term ‘this something’ cannot properly apply to the persons of the trinity.
The reason Henry is distinguishing between these two names in the first place,
we should remember, is driven by his larger discussion of the divine persons in the
Christian God. These are two names which are commonly used to speak about that
personhood, so, they must be carefully examined if one seeks to speak wisely on the
subject. Henry acknowledges that a problem arises when one wishes to speak about the
persons of God, if one wishes to say that the monotheistic, albeit triune, God contains
different ‘individual, this something’s’ given the above distinctions. In the case of God,
or the divine persons, the term ‘individual’ and its parallel name, in meaning, ‘this’ can
both refer, but the added meaning implied by the inclusion of ‘something’ does not
apply.
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It cannot apply because something, unlike indivisibility or this-ness alone, implies
the character of ‘otherness’ in supposite. And, as Henry maintains, there is nothing
‘other’ in God, insofar as ‘other’ expresses a difference in nature or essence. God, as the
divine persons, may be triune (in other words, his meaning may encompass this-ness, or
the character of three individuated entities in reality) but must have only one nature
and essence. Christ is not another essence apart from the Holy Spirit in a real sense.
Since the difference of meaning between divine and human persons cannot lie in
otherness, or something, by virtue of different natures/essences, the difference must be
accounted for, he argues, through otherness of supposites.
Since the neuter form of ‘other’ names by itself (i.e. without the attached ‘this’)
an essential difference, when used absolutely (as when one says ‘this something’ to
express the meaning discussed above), it would be incorrect to admit that of God. (If it
is meant absolutely- namely, that in God, one of the divine supposites is something
other than the other.) But, it is said (functions/designates meaning) correctly if it is
meant to determine that one supposite is different from the other.
If we want to speak properly of God and creatures using the same terms, we
must distinguish the sense, or meaning, of ‘other’ in its different applications. For
example, the difference in the sense of the masculine form of the term as opposed to
the neuter case. In this case, of course, as it relates to our use of the names ‘individual’
and ‘this something’ to refer to God the Father, the son, and/or the Holy Spirit. We can
say that, in creatures, an individual supposite is a ‘this something.’ It is an individual or
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something (entity) individuated in itself, but also something other than another
supposite which has something in a common essence but in an individual essence
something also different. And this causes no problem because the entities referred to
(distinguished by the terms as separate) in reality are also different ‘something’s’ with
different natures and essences.102
But when we apply these terms to God, as the divine persons (as opposed to
human persons), we must distinguish differently, so as not to imply a difference of
natures and essences between the entities to which the names refer. We must, in other
words, use different names. In God, as opposed to creatures which can be called ‘this
something’s,’ a supposite is properly said to be, rather, ‘this someone.’ The use, or
function, of the name ‘this someone’ is meant to convey two things. First, by ‘this’ which
is an expression of a singular existence in a supposite (individuality). And secondly, by
‘someone’ which refers to some one as opposed to another and distinct from him, but
not of another nature/essence. ‘Someone’ expresses one general instance of a nature
from a group of instances of that nature.

Singulare
Besides speaking of the divine persons as ‘individual’ in character, or as ‘this
someone,’ we are also inclined to use the word ‘singular’ in our descriptions of such
102

“Unde si proprie velimus loqui in divinis sicut in creaturis, debemus in hoc nomine ‘alius’ distinguere
rationem generis masculini et neutri, ut sicut in creaturis proprie dicimus individuum suppositum esse ‘hoc
aliquid,’ ‘hoc’ id est in se individuum sive individuatum, sed ab alio supposito aliud quid, hoc est in
essential communi quid, sed in essential individuali aliud quid ab essential condivisi, sic in Deo proprie
dicitur suppositum hic aliquis, ‘hic’ id est in supposito singulare existens, sed ab alio supposito alius quis et
distinctus ad eo.” SLIII, Q1, p7, 96-103.

75

instances. So, Henry takes up the meaning of this term next. He does so, placing the
term ‘singular’ as a segue between the first two terms and the next five to follow,
because, he says, the next six terms are all found in a created reality and an uncreated
one, but singularity differs from the terms which shall follow by virtue of being found in
common accidents. According to Henry, that which is singular is found in common in
accidents as well as in substances. (While, as mentioned, he will demonstrate that the
next five names are found only in terms of the latter.)
The character of something singular is, by definition, that of being one solitary
something.103 And, because the term ‘singular’ includes the meaning of ‘solitary,’ the
term singular can be understood in two distinct ways, namely, absolutely or with a
determination. When the term ‘singular’ is understood in the first way (absolutely) it
cannot be admitted of God’s character, based upon the teachings of Peter Lombard, and
the established tradition of the period. Henry cites book I of the Sentences, where the
Master says that ‘singularity or solitariness shows that a plurality of persons is
excluded.’104
If understood this way, Henry maintains, it would be false to assert of human
beings that one human being, like Socrates, is singular. It would be false because it
would exclude, by virtue of the term’s distinguishing character, or function, the
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“Sed illud quod est singulare invenitur communitur in accidentibus et substantiis; alia vero quinque in
substantiis tantum. Singularis autem ratio est quod sit unum aliquid solitarium. Sed intelligendum quod
singulare includendo solitarium potest intelligi absolute vel cum determinatione.” (SLIII,Q1,p8,105-109.)

104
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fellowship of all others who share in human nature along with Socrates. But, since the
term can be understood alternatively (with a determination), as will be shown below,
Henry holds that it may apply to human beings in one way and in divine persons (God)
another.
‘For in God,’ Henry writes, ‘there cannot be solitariness in either act or in
potency.’105 In other words, the divine persons, though triune and distinct, do not
contain multiple acts and potency in the way described by Lombard. This differs from
human persons, since in the case of Socrates and his fellow human beings, there can be
solitariness in act. Humanity, as such, could exist in only a single supposite. So, Henry is
led to conclude that we may speak of the solitariness of human beings (i.e. use the term
‘singular’ to refer) in an absolute manner, only if we mean by that the singular whole of
humanity, not the particular instance of ‘Socrates.’ We cannot speak absolutely at all of
the divine persons in terms of absolute singularity though.
However, ruling out an absolute function for the term does not exclude it from
use all together. For Henry returns now to the second way in which we may understand
‘singularity.’ Rather than absolutely, the term can also be taken ‘with a determination.’
In this way, then, it (the character of ‘singular’) can be admitted in both (human beings
as well as God/the divine persons) with regard to the essence and with regard to the
supposite. If used properly, in other words, we may speak accurately of God and human
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“…quia in divinis non potest esse solitudo neque actu neque potentia;” SLIII, Q1, p8, 115-116.

77

beings using the same name to refer to the presence of a certain type of singularity
without violating the univocal nature of the former.
Henry needs to be able to speak this way of the divine persons because they do,
in a sense, contain a certain singularity and a singular essence, or else we would not be
able to refer to the triune nature as a whole or speak meaningfully about the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit separately.106 Although the deity is, Henry wants to maintain,
singular in nature, that singularity must also encompass (in some manner) the addition
of other, singular persons.
The Father of the trinity, for example, is a certain singular person. But, while
singular, the character does not exclude the fellowship of many persons (like a Son) as it
would have in the previous case of absolute meaning. This is coherent, yet avoids the
violations of an absolute use, similarly to our being able to say of Peter that ‘Peter is a
singular person,’ without the intention of excluding him from the larger fellowship of
human beings, but rather, in order to distinguish him by excluding the plurality (or
plurification) of that in which the singularity is said to exist, whether that be in the
essence or the supposite. In this way, or, taken with this determination, the meaning of
the term ‘singular’ can refer to both the created and uncreated.
However, though it may refer similarly in the case above, the character of being
‘singular’ belongs to the essence and supposite of creatures differently than it does to
the essence and supposite in God. For, unlike the created, in the uncreated (in God)
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singularity belongs to the essence itself, not by virtue of having being in a person, but by
virtue of being divine.107 (Henry as has already drawn out above his reasons for holding
that the deity must be understood as a singular essence of itself.108 ) So, when we speak
of ‘God the Father’ as a singular instance, or of ‘God the Son’ our mention of the name
is not meant to imply exclusion/multiplicity of essences, but rather the persons of God,
as Peter is a person of humanity. (In this restricted sense, and nothing more.)
The term ‘singular’ differs, then, when applied to humanity as opposed to the
divine, insofar as it is not a ‘this’ of itself, but only by virtue of belonging to ‘this’ person.
(Also established above.) So, the difference in use/meaning lies in the way in which the
term is understood to relate to essence and supposite. Singularity, as Henry will
continue to discuss, has being in a different way in God and in creatures. So, while it
may apply, in a specialized sense, it does not suffice to convey the proper meaning of
divine personhood.

Res Naturae
Henry’s discussion of singularity, i.e. the term ‘singular,’ is followed by a brief
treatment of ‘natural things.’ As Henry suggests, ‘natural things’ are different from that
which is said to be ‘singular.’ Natural things differ from singularity, insofar as the
meaning of ‘singular’ belongs to both an essence and a supposite. The term ‘natural
107

“Deitas enim est singularitas quaedam sive quaedam singularis essential ex se, ut habitum est supra.
Non sic autem humanitas, quia ex se non est hoc, sed solummodo quia est huius, ut similiter supra
habitum est. Aliter similiter habet esse in supposito singularitas in Deo et in cretauris, ut declarabitur
infra.” (SLIII,Q1,p8,129-133.)
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thing,’ however, does not apply to an essence, but only a supposite. As a result, the
character of a supposite is not found in accidents (arbitrary attributes attached to
substances), but only in substances themselves. The essence, in contrast, is itself a
nature- regardless of whether it is that of a substance or an accident. So, Henry
maintains, only the supposite of a substance can properly be said to be a natural
thing.109 Henry bases this claim upon his ideas on the nature of essence, specifically,
that whether it be accidental or substantial, essence has ratification of its existence only
in the supposite of a substance. For, as Henry mentions elsewhere in his discussion of
‘individual,’ “a natural thing is properly said to be an individual, but a nature is said to be
the essence of a thing whether in itself or as individuated in a supposite.”110
The notion of substance is then used as a segue into Henry’s treatment of the next
term- ‘subsistence.’

Subsistentia
Henry’s discussion of the meaning of ‘natural things’ concludes with a brief
reference to substance. He notes there that essence (whether of substance or accident)
only becomes ratified in the supposite of a substance. Substance, then, applies to
individuals. Henry uses this characteristic to distinguish the meaning of ‘subsistence’
from the other terms in question.
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“Solum vero suppositum substantiae est res naturae, quia esstentia sive substantialis sive accidentalis
ratitudinem suae existentiae non habet nisi in supposito substantiae.” (SLIII,Q1,p9,139-141.)

110

SLIII, Q1, par. 6.

80

In the tenth paragraph of this question, Henry takes up the meaning of
‘subsistence.’ Having already related substance strictly to individuals, it is at this point
where he considers ‘subsistence’ in relation to universals. Noting the etymological roots
of the term, he appeals to its common usage, as it functioned for both the Greeks and
Latins. According to this standard meaning, he maintains, ‘subsistence’ belongs in
common to both individuals and universals. Subsistence applies to something which is
universal, in that it belongs to a genus and a species, while also being used to apply
to/belongs to individuals. Subsistence means ‘to subsist.’ Unlike the substance of an
individual, subsistence implies the act of holding oneself up. As Henry says, ‘it is meant
to stand in holding oneself up.’ Subsistence, therefore, belongs to everything that is in
the category of substance. (Insofar as it is substance.111) We might think of this in terms
of the circles of a Venn Diagram- where each circle represents a term and includes all
those things which that term applies too. In the case of substance and subsistence, the
circle representing ‘substance’ would be contained in a larger circle of those things
which are said to subsist.
At this point, then, Henry has established the meaning of (individual*), ‘this
something,’ ‘singular,’ ‘natural thing,’ and ‘subsistence.’ The nature of substance, or the
meaning of the term used to refer to substance, has been mentioned in the previous
discussions- used as a point of distinction for gaining clarity on the terms ‘natural thing’
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“Dicitur enim subsistere sive subsistencia quasi se ipsum ‘tenendo sistere’, et convenit omni ei quod est
in praedicamento substantiae in quantum substancia est.” (SLIII,Q1,p10, 145-147.)
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and ‘subsistence’ specifically. So, building upon what he has already said about the
term, Henry moves next to an examination of ‘substance.’

Substare
‘Subsistence,’ for the ancient Greeks and Latins, meant ‘to stand in holding
oneself up.’ This characteristic is said to belong to those things of an individual nature as
well as to universals. ‘Substance,’ however, implies the connotation ‘to stand under.’
According to Henry, substance is said to mean that which is under something else
(whether under accidents or universals) that strictly belongs to an individual
substance.112 He cites Aristotle and Boethius as exemplary support for his claim about
this meaning. In the Categories, Henry notes, first substance is “most of all and
principally said to be that which is neither in another nor said of another.”113 But other
things are in substance or said of it too. Therefore, as he also cites, Boethius continued
to make the further claim, in On the Two Natures, “Substances subsist only in particular
individuals. For the understanding of universals is taken from particulars. Hence, since
essences exist in universals, they receive substance in particulars.”114 It stands under,
Henry suggests, in that it offers a subject to accidents in which/so that they can be. (i.e.,
become actualized in a substance.) Again, Henry is carefully treating the meaning of the
eight terms by distinguishing them from one another. He has given a restricted
definition of substance as it relates to subsistence, considering each term in the context
112
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of individuals and universals. This is a clear point at which we see the discussion of his
theory of universals arise out of his questions about the divine persons!
Henry understands this as a progression of Boethius’ own consideration for the
etymological roots of the term. For Boethius writes, in the same text mentioned above,
that genus and species only subsist because accidents do not properly belong to them.
Individuals, however, are not only admitted by Boethius to subsist, but also to stand
under in the manner that is proper to substance alone. In that text, Henry notes that
Boethius also gave consideration for the common usage of the term by the ancient
Greeks. According to him, “they call hypostases individual substances, because they
stand under other things and are subject to other things, such as accidents.”115 So,
Boethius’ acknowledgment confirms, ‘substances’ are used by the Latins much the same
way ‘hypostases’ is used by the Greeks.
To summarize at this point for clarity, all substances subsist, but not all subsisting
things are substances. Substances subsist, furthermore, only in particular individuals,
and therefore, not in universals alone because those are taken from particulars. The
term ‘substance,’ then, implies a different meaning than the Latin ‘subsistence’ which is
closer in function to that of the Greek ‘hypostases.’ ‘Supposite’ however, as Henry takes
up next, does convey the same meaning as ‘subsistence.’ In fact, Henry claims that they
are ‘entirely the same.’116
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I include here, somewhat out of order with the primary text, Henry’s final
comment on the meaning of this term. After treating the meaning of ‘supposite,’ but
before addressing the term ‘person,’ Henry makes a comment about a change to the
meaning of ‘substance.’ He says that, despite the common usage of the ancients, there
was (by the time he is writing) a different function for the name as it was being used
among the Latins and Greeks. He, along with his contemporaries, does not use the term
in the same way, in part, because of a distinction pointed out by Augustine in On the
Trinity. Augustine states there that, unlike the Greeks, the Latin use of ‘substance’
developed to assume an implication about essence. And, ‘essence’ is not usually
understood in another way other than substance. This final inclusion of ‘essence’ will
provide his segue into his treatment of the term ‘person.’ But, first, let us return to the
meaning of ‘supposite.’

Suppositum
If the term ‘supposite’ means entirely the same thing as the term ‘subsistence,’
as Henry maintains at the beginning of this section, one might wonder why it merits its
own treatment as a term at all. Or, at least, why it merits more than the mere statement
of equivalence alone. ‘Supposite’ does mean the same thing for Henry as ‘subsistence’
in terms of, or in relation to, substance. (The term just discussed above.) These two
terms imply similar meaning insofar as they both belong to what is singular, as well as
that which is universal, in the category of substance. This is, specifically, due to the
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shared function of standing for either ‘what is signified or what is named.’117 A
‘supposite’ however, is different, because in something singular, the same thing is
signified and named, but this is not the case in respect to universals.
Henry then offers a final reflection on the meaning of ‘substance’ (which I have
included out of order, but on topic, in the section devoted to that term118 ) before
addressing the notion of ‘person.’ So, at this point let us revisit his remarks on
‘individuum.’
‘Individual’ is the first of the eight terms to be examined by Henry in this
question. But, I have chosen to hold it and analyze it here, so that it will be placed in
direct relation to his treatment of ‘person,’ which is the last of the eight terms to be
discussed. I place them in this context, primarily, for the sake of clarity against my larger
thesis- one which I situate in relation to Gracia’s work on The Problem of Individuation in
the Middle Ages.119
Henry takes up the meaning of ‘individual’ in response to a statement made by
Boethius in On the Two Natures. In the passage of note, Boethius asserts that “If one
wants to say ‘nature’ of all natural things, such a definition will be given that can include
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all the things that exist. Such a nature belongs to those things that, since they exist, can
be grasped by the intellect.”120 According to Henry, then, each of the eight terms
represent and signify almost the same thing with regard to the nature and essence of a
natural thing, when nature is taken in its broadest sense. Boethius’ definition, Henry
acknowledges, defines substances and accidents. But, it should be understood that the
term ‘individual’ (as well as ‘this something’) is found only in the essence of a creature,
i.e. a created thing, both in substances and accidents alike, but not in any way in the
uncreated, or, the divine/God. Henry insists upon this distinction because, for example,
the term ‘individual’ gets meaning from a distinction. ‘Individual,’ he maintains, is
distinguished over/against (derives meaning from) ‘non-individual’ as its contrary.
Something non-individual can only exist where there is something really universal. Nor,
he argues, is the term used with intention of referring to the non-individual except
when pointing to a universal. For an individual, by virtue of the meaning of the term, is
only applied to something particular- in other words, for singulars individuated under a
universal. (See discussion of substance as ‘to stand under’ in Part V.) And, in the
alternative manner, the character of ‘individual’ is only intended in cases of particular
instances with regard to reality.121 This distinction is significant considering his overall
project of applying these terms to a notion of ‘person’ which must include the divine
persons of a triune nature.
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The application of ‘individual,’ as Henry presents it, is related to the character of
universals and particulars. But, in God, Henry notices, it is not possible to find the
character of a real universal or particular.122 So, it will similarly not be possible to find
the character of an individual, except by extending the name ‘individual’ to the
character of a singular. In other words, in order to properly apply the term ‘individual’ to
the divine persons, the meaning of the term needs to be extended beyond the one
addressed at the start. Henry points to an example of this distinction employed in the
Decretals, where it is written ‘This holy Trinity individual according to the common
essence…And separate in accord with the personal properties.’123 He uses this is an
example of extension- in this case, ‘separation’ has been extended to mean ‘distinction.’
Now the term may be properly applied, because separation does not belong to God, but
distinction must.

Persona
The last of the eight terms to be considered by Henry in question 1, article 53 of
his Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa) is ‘person.’ At this point, he has presented an
account for the meaning of seven other terms- individual, this something, singular,
natural thing, subsistence, substance, and supposite- inquiring as to whether they can
be properly applied to/synonymous with each other. He has undertaken this
examination, remember, to address the question of whether it is necessary to hold that
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there is a person in God. So, the ultimate project is to relate each of these terms to the
final word, ‘person.’
According to his articulation of the meaning of the aforementioned terms,
“‘substance,’ ‘supposite,’ ‘subsistence,’ and such like,” are said with an improper
meaning if applied to God, “insofar as it depends on character of the name,” because
what subsists (stands/holding up) in God does not stand under anything else- neither
universal nor accidental. The confusion stems, Henry asserts, from the original usage of
the term as belonging to creatures, and therefore implying creaturely impositions. But,
in God, when the meaning is extended (or distinguished) as he suggests here, ‘person’
subsists by itself in the essence.124
Following his consideration of ‘supposite’ and ‘substance,’ Henry returns his
attention to etymological differences found between ancient Greek and Latin uses of
these terms, this time with respect to ‘person.’ The Greeks, he writes, use the word
‘person’ to signify the same thing (in reality) as ‘hypostases’ or ‘substance’ could. The
Latin usage of the term, however, developed a point of contrast regarding the generality
of that usage and over the proper meaning it should be understood and purported to
convey. When it comes to the generality of usage, Henry reasons that the Latins use the
name ‘hypostases’ or ‘substance’ without any difference (both in intellectual and nonintellectual beings), whereas the Greeks use ‘substance’ only in rational beings.125 And,
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he argues, a similar difference occurs in the meaning of ‘prosopon.’ Or, ‘persona.’ He
credits Boethius for drawing the distinction: ‘When they say prosopa, we can also call
the same substances persons.’126 Henry notes that the Latin usage applies only to
intellectual or rational beings. “For,” he writes, “although it signifies the same intention
in creatures as this name ‘individual,’ it does so with regard to a determinate matter,
namely, rational.”127 (Again, supported by Boethius.)
At this point, Henry provides an example by way of analogy- relating the terms
‘snub’ and ‘curved’ in terms of a nose. Henry points out, of course, that ‘snub’ and
‘curved’ signify the same thing (namely, a particular characteristic of the nose), but the
latter does so indifferently with respect to any matter, whereas the former, ‘snub,’
signifies, or refers to, the same thing, just in specific respect to nose like things.128 For
example, a road may be ‘curved,’ as well as a sculpture, or signature, or dimensional
plane. But ‘snub’ is used to indicate that feature in noses alone. In the same way then,
he encourages, one can think about the meanings/usage of ‘individual’ and ‘person.’
‘Individual’ signifies something indeterminate in relation to a rational and non-rational
nature (like ‘curved’ signifies beyond the context of a nose), yet ‘person’ signifies
something determinate- something proper to a rational nature. (‘Person’ then is
analogous in our example to ‘snub.’) So, he reasons, the name ‘person’ “implies a
126
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character of dignity”129 that the former does not. Henry means by this that, because the
term ‘person’ is reserved for a more restricted/specific case of objects it can refer, it
implies/imposes a higher, more sophisticated, level of meaning. In the same way ‘snub’
captures something specific to nose-type things that ‘curved’ cannot (due to its
generality of use), so too the term ‘person’ captures something about things of a
rational nature which the term ‘individual’ cannot.
Understood in the manner put forth, Henry maintains, the term ‘person’ can
be/is admitted in God without any improper meaning of the name. In other words, the
word can be used and applied to signify the divine without violating the essence of that
which it is intended to refer. He pauses here, before moving on to the reply portion of
the question, to bring Richard of St. Victor back to the forefront of the discussion. In On
the Trinity Richard points out that ‘some call persons subsistence’s and others call them
substances,’ but ‘…they can less properly’ be said to be so. While in the Latin usage ‘no
name can be found that can be better suited to the divine plurality than the name
‘person.’130 Henry is using Richard’s statements here as an illustration of the value he
has placed upon the term ‘person’ over ‘individual’ above, given the restricted nature of
its signification.
To the first argument (that ‘rational’ and ‘individual’ are, according to Boethius,
placed in the definition of person) Henry responds that ‘Person,’ when understood after
his treatment of the names, ‘subsists by itself in the essence’. Boethius’ ‘rational’ can be
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expanded to include ‘the purely intellectual’ and ‘individual’ in terms of
‘incommunicable.’ What subsists in God, he argues, cannot be said to stand underneath
something, whether that be a universal or set of accidents.131 For, “where Boethius says
that ‘a person is an individual substance of a rational nature’, Richard says that ‘a person
is an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature. But how this definition must
be understood and explained, will be seen below.”
To the second argument, that there is said to be three persons in the divine in
order that one may have something to say of it, Henry responds that one should take
Augustine to be right “on account of the novelty of the use of the same name with
regard to God.” Henry suggests that Augustine was simply attempting to show that
Christians could meaningfully speak of the triune nature of the Trinity, when asked
about the matter by probing heretics. That which is expressed by the name ‘person’ was
in truth from eternity in God according to its true meaning, or could be conceived with
regard to him, and that the usage of the term was forced to take on false meanings
when misunderstood or taken out of context. (Though Henry does acknowledge here
that Augustine did not provide a sufficient account for the heretics through his
statement, but only a comfort to the believers.) He references Richard again as having
seen this problem and addressed it in book 4, chp. 5 of his work On the Trinity. Richard
argues in that text for the important role of the Holy Spirit in proper conceptualization
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of the names. As such, he concludes, this is the meaning one should be after when
inquiring into the nature of the divine persons.
Yes, this is a metaphysical account of personhood, insofar as it is an attempt to
define the reality, or real nature, of the subject in question. But, Henry addresses this
inquiry by way of asking how the term applies- whether it is a term of first or second
intention, whether the word applies to the actual individual or the universal concept,
what distinctions and relations should be considered…these are epistemic questions,
which demonstrate an awareness of and sensitivity to linguistic, as well as logical,
implications. Prior to this study, a discussion of the persons in the Trinity may not have
seemed an obvious, or even helpful, place to look for Henry’s theory of universals. Yet,
here it is. This is the epistemological turn. Henry is unique in being sensitive to the fact
that metaphysical discussions of substance, person, etc. have epistemological
consequences or epistemological assumptions. Henry was perhaps the first secular
theologian to demonstrate this awareness, or, at least, make it explicit in his
metaphysical analyses.132
And, this is the crux of my thesis. Henry acknowledges that the term ‘persona’
may be problematic as it had been used and understood by his predecessors and
contemporaries. So, he considers the other possible options. As we know, the persons
of the trinity are incredibly important for Christian theologians and medieval
philosophers to get right. So, if there was a more accurate way of thinking and speaking
132

Henry’s analysis of the status of universals seems remarkably close to Abelard who got into trouble for
his “nominalism,” even though this oversimplified Abelard’s position. Henry does not get in trouble for his
theory. Just an interesting point that might one day merit closer attention
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about the subject, one ought to consider it seriously. Henry does just that. For if one of
the other eight terms could convey the same meaning and prove useful in forming the
same concept of ‘person’ yet without the historical pitfalls of that term, such a
correction should be made. Hence, the exercise of article 53, question 1. But in
examining the eight terms, Henry arrives at the conclusion that this cannot be achieved.
The term person conveys something unique which no other available terms can achieve
when applied to the divine nature. In fact, the epistemological consequence of using a
term other than ‘persona’ is worse than any seemingly negative consequences that
come along with it because something essentially important is lost.
Here, we must consider Henry’s notion of ‘incommunicability.’ For it is the
reason Henry thinks it necessary to hold the notion of the divine persons. As he
demonstrates, the term ‘person’ implies an uncommon-ness which the other terms
available fail to capture. A person, specifically, lacks any commonness with any other
entity. This is why it is so important for our understanding of the divine nature. Here is
his correction of Richard of St. Victor’s treatment of the term. Henry claims that Richard
missed this important point, and furthermore, that his analysis is incomplete because of
it. This uncommonness cannot be articulated by any other term than person, and so, it
is necessary that the triune nature of the divine be labeled, rightly, as persons rather
than individuals, supposites, and so on. Let us now lay out his comparison of the eight
terms more clearly so that we might see why this is the case.
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CHAPTER 5
AN ANALYSIS OF SUMMA, ARTICLE 53, QUESTION 1
The Medieval style of writing can often seem scattered and obtuse to the
modern reader. And Henry’s teachings are known to be a challenge. John Duns Scotus
admitted to his own difficulty in navigating through Henry’s thought, in part because it
was ever evolving, but also because Henry seldom states his own stance directly. One
must often absorb the whole and sit back to reflect upon the details before the general
meaning will present itself. In the case of question 1 and Henry’s treatment of the eight
terms, it is helpful to lay out the consequences of his discussion in an organized, applied
manner so that we can see the results of his arguments in the same way his students
might have in a discussion after his lecture. Taking the above exegesis into account, let
us consider the first seven terms separately as they each compare to the term ‘person.’
Because as Henry himself admits at the start of his discussion “these names represent
and signify almost the same thing with regard to the nature and essence of a natural
thing, when nature is taken in a very broad sense.”133 So let us arrange them in regard
to ‘person’ specifically.
Remember the original problems which Henry posed as the motivation for this
question: the implications of Boethius’ use of the terms ‘rational nature’ and ‘individual

133

Teske, 2014. p.5

94

substance,’ and Augustine’s remark that one only uses the term ‘person’ so as
not to remain silent. Also, recall Henry’s insistence upon attributing to God only that
which is most noble and worthy of perfection.
Based upon Henry’s definition of a person: p4: “Person names something that is
without qualification of dignity. For, from what it signifies, it names the character of
something incommunicable…and this comes from the perfection of him who has in
himself what cannot be communicated to another.” (“It also names that with regard to
a rational or intellectual nature…”)

The Eight Terms, Compared
I.

Are all instances of ‘this something’ a person? NO
Are all ‘persons’ referred to by ‘this something’? NO
This something, according to Henry, has a two-fold meaning. ‘This’ captures the

equivalent meaning of ‘individual’ and the addition of ‘something’ connects onto that
the sense of otherness (i.e. an other nature or essence in a supposite). So, there are
instances of things that exist as ‘this something’ which are not persons. And there are
instances of persons which do not exist as ‘somethings.’ But rather, ‘someone.’
The relevance of distinction comes into play here, because Henry points out the
difference between the meaning of ‘other’ through the masculine and neuter genders,
where the neuter is absolute, and the masculine allows for the distinction to allow for
some ‘one’ instead of some ‘thing.’
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II.

Are all ‘singular’ entities persons? NO
Are all ‘persons’ singular? NO

The character of something singular, according to Henry, is that of one solitary
something. So, there are singular entities which would not be considered persons and
there are divine persons which would not be considered singular since they are neither
‘something’ nor solitary. Now, again, a distinction can be made, Henry acknowledges,
between the absolute singularity of human persons and the restricted singularity of
God’s essence which does not include God’s personhood. For example, Socrates and
Plato are both singular humans. If Socrates dies, humanity remains in Plato as a singular
human. God is a singular nature, but God is not three separate persons such that God
would still be God without the person of the Father.
III.

Is every ‘natural thing’ a person? NO
Are all ‘persons’ natural things? NO

A natural thing, according to Henry, is properly said to be an individual (*p6) and
belongs only to a supposite/substance. So, there are many non-person beings and
objects that count as natural things. But the incommunicable element of personhood
does not require a supposite/substance/individual in the case of God. Thus, persons
which are not natural things.
IV.

Is every ‘subsistence’ a person? NO
Is every ‘person’ a subsistence? NO
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Subsistence, according to Henry, belongs in common to something universal,
that is to a genus and to a species, and to individuals. “To subsist” is said as if it meant to
stand in holding oneself up, and it belongs to everything that is in the category of
substance.134 Thus, there are entities which subsist as something other than persons.
And the persons of God do not subsist, insofar as they are not universals/individuals.
(See ‘supposite’ which Henry takes to be a synonymous term.)
Later, when Henry is discussing the meaning of person, he makes a distinction with
respect to subsistence. Stating that it is improperly applied to God if meant to ‘stand
under,’ he notes that one could say, appropriately, that a person subsists by itself in the
essence. But this still requires the unique notion of personhood and therefore is not as
noble a signification as ‘person’ alone.
V.

Are all ‘substances’ persons? NO
Do all ‘persons’ have substance? NO

Substance, according to Henry, means ‘to stand under.’ That is, to stand under
something else, be it accident or universal, and therefore properly implies individual
substance. Thus, there are many substances that are not persons. And there are
persons, such as God the father, who are not particularized by some other universal as a
substance. Henry notes a difference between the use of ‘substance’ among the Greeks
as opposed to the Latin use by his students and colleagues. The Greeks use substance
only in the case of rational beings, whereas the Latin use is more general. Yet, as he
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explains, the Latin use of person is more specific, implying the addition of rational and
essence. Thus, a distinction is needed between prosopon and persona.
VI.

Is every ‘supposite’ a person? NO
Is every ‘person’ a supposite? NO

Supposite, according to Henry, is “entirely the same” as ‘subsistence.’135 It belongs
to what is universal, as well as what is singular, in the category of substance. Since they
stand for what is signified or named, there are non-person supposites. But there are
also divine persons which are not properly said to be supposites, insofar as they are not
attached to substance as individual or universal. (See ‘subsistence.’)
VII.

Are all ‘individuals’ persons? NO
Are all ‘persons’ individual? NO

An individual, according to Henry, is something in-dividuated under a universal. So,
there are many non-person particulars which are individual. And uncreated, divine
persons which are neither nor attached to universals, and so are not individual. The
issue of distinction becomes clear at this point, when Henry caveats that the term
‘individual’ can apply to the divine persons in a restricted sense as singular/separate if
extended to distinction.
VIII.

Persons

All persons, are, therefore: beings of an intellectual nature and an incommunicable
essential quality.
135
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All persons, are not, therefore: instances of ‘this something’, absolute ‘singularity,’
‘natural things,’ ‘subsistence,’ ‘substance,’, ‘supposite,’ or ‘individual.’
Some persons- namely created, human persons- also happen to be instances of
singularity, subsistence, individuality, and so on. But the logical claim ‘All’ does not apply
because of the uniqueness of the divine persons as having none of those other qualities
absolutely.
Henry has essentially constructed verbal Venn diagrams which demonstrate the
existence of elements unique to the category of ‘person.’ They necessitate the use of
the term, and in some ways define it, whereby ‘person’ captures that subset of meaning
which falls outside the realms of the other seven terms. Once captured through
comparison, one can mentally organize the idea of an incommunicable essence in its
own right and make proper use of the other terms to draw distinctions.
Of note here is a reflection upon Henry’s original explanation for the
organization of this article as a whole. “We must deal with those attributes that pertain
to the distinction of the persons first by considering those that pertain to those that are
proper (only to be followed by those that are appropriated). And with regard to those
that are proper, we must first deal with those that pertain to the individual persons by
themselves (secondly with those that belong in relation to each other). And with regard
to the individual persons, we must first deal with them in general. And in general as
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persons, secondly with the properties of the persons called notions.”136 He has stayed
true to his original proposal.

The Eight Terms, Applied
To help us understand Henry’s sense of these eight terms in application, and the
ontology he constructs with them, let us apply them to beings of a varied nature. For
illustration, I have chosen examples from the categories of uncreated being, human
animal, non-human animal, and inanimate object. (Specifically, God the father, Jonah
the man, a whale, and a sea pebble.) According to Henry, the eight terms would be
applied to these beings, properly, if understood in the following manner:
The Sea Pebble
1. This Something? Yes.
A sea pebble is an individual object, apart from the sand and sea, with its own
existence apart from other sea pebbles.
2. Singular? Yes.
A sea pebble is one, solitary existing thing. It is a singular example, or a particular
instance, of a universal.
3. Natural Thing? Yes.
Since natural things belong to supposites, which belong to substances, and sea
pebbles are instances of substance, a sea pebble exists as a natural thing.
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4. Subsistence? Yes.
Subsistence belongs to everything that is in the category of substance. Thus, sea
pebbles, insofar as they are instances of substance, subsist.
5. Substance? Yes.
Substance, as defined by Henry from the Categories, is “most of all and principally
said to be that which is neither in another nor said of another, but other things are in it
and said of it…It stands under because it offers a subject to accidents so that they can
be.”137 So a sea pebble, as an individual particular instance of a pebble, is a substance.
Thus, we can attribute accidents to it, like it is a ‘grey pebble’ or a ‘round pebble.’
6. Supposite? Yes.
Entirely the same, according to Henry, as subsistence, the sea pebble exists as a
singular in the category of substance.
7. Individual? Yes.
A sea pebble is a substance with accidents which subsists as a particular instance of
a universal notion of ‘pebble’ and is distinguished against non-individual as its contrary.
Thus, is an individual according to Henry’s definition of the term.
8. Person? No.
Henry’s working definition of a person requires a being of an intellectual/rational
nature. So even setting aside the matter of incommunicability, a sea pebble does not fit
the bill.
137
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The Whale
1. This Something? Yes.
We can stand before the whale and point to it as an individual, existing beingseparate from our ourselves and from other whales and from the sea pebble. Thus,
signifying it as an other.
2. Singular? Yes.
The whale is not all whales. It is a solitary instance of the multitude of whales which
swim in the sea.
3. Natural Thing? Yes.
A whale is made up of substance, situated as an existing occurrence in nature.
4. Subsistence? Yes.
Again, insofar as a whale is an individual substance and natural thing, it subsists.
5. Substance? Yes.
A whale is an object we can attribute accidents to, susceptible to generation and
decay.
6. Supposite? Yes.
A whale is an instance of a supposite, insofar as it is a singular individual.
7. Individual? Yes.
The whale is an undivided sort of whole, which subsists as an example of the
universal concept of whale- apart from or alongside other particular whales.
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8. Person? No.
I chose a whale (as opposed to a dolphin or household pet), in part because of its
role in a well-known story about uncreated and created beings, but also to stay away
from the human/non-human debate. As far as Henry was concerned, along with most of
his students and colleagues, whales were in no way intellectual beings with an
incommunicable essence. If we were to apply his definition through the modern lens of
possible non-human persons, this conclusion may change to include such a category.
But that would be our own modification to the ontology, by way of Henry’s original
teaching.
Jonah, the man
1. This Something? Yes.
As an instance of an individual ‘this’ + the addition of otherness, one could point to
Jonah as ‘this something.’ (Using the neuter form of the term.) Yet in addition, and
unlike the sea pebble and the whale, Jonah has the quality of personhood. As such, he is
more properly referred to by the male-gendered descriptor this ‘someone.’
2. Singular? Yes.
Jonah is a solitary being, subsisting as a singular supposite, if we mean to imply that
he, as a single man, is an instance of the universal ‘humanity.’
3. Natural Thing? Yes.
Jonah is a rational animal, and therefore, a substance. So too is he a natural thing.
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4. Subsistence? Yes.
Insofar as Jonah is a substance with accidents, he also has the quality of subsistence.
5. Substance? Yes.
Jonah, the animal, is a physical object susceptible to generation and decay. Insofar
as he is considered in that manner, he is considered a substance. If we mean by ‘Jonah’
the incommunicable nature of personhood, that must be distinguished as a separate
notion.
6. Supposite? Yes.
Jonah is a supposite because he is a singular, individual being as an essence with
accidental qualities.
7. Individual? Yes.
Jonah is an individual man as a particular instance of the universal humanity. He is
not David, Peter, or Paul. But he stands with them under the same universal ‘man.’ He
has otherness through his accidental qualities, substance, and so on.
8. Person? Yes.
Jonah is considered a person because, unlike the sea pebble and the whale, he is a
rational animal of an intellectual nature with the quality of an incommunicable essence.
In other words, Jonah has something within himself that cannot be communicated to
another. It is worth taking note of this point in Henry. Here we find his philosophy of
personhood as somehow related to our notion of self-consciousness- insofar as we
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mean by that a ‘privileged access’ like what Henry might intend through his use of
‘incommunicability.’
God, the Father
1. This Something? No.
According to Henry’s understanding of ‘individual’ as a particular falling under a
universal, and his view of ‘this’ as synonymous with ‘individual,’ God’s being is not
relevant to the term ‘this.’ And since he takes the term ‘something’ to imply the
addition of substance, and otherness, this does not properly apply to God either. Like in
the case of Jonah the human person, God is more appropriately referred to as
‘someone.’ Unlike Jonah, however, alternate distinctions are required so as not to
confuse the otherness of ‘someone’ with a separateness of the divine persons as one
God.
2. Singular? No.
God the Father is not singular, if ‘singular’ is meant absolutely, because plurality of
persons would be excluded by singularity of supposite. A distinction must be made,
however, with regards to a determination towards essence. God is singular of essence,
while at the same time containing the singularity of fatherness.
3. Natural Thing? No.
Natural things, according to Henry, belong to substance, of which God the Father is
not. Note that I specified God the Father, as opposed to the divine persons. Jesus, at the
point of being a human man, was perhaps a natural thing. But that is a complicated
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rabbit hole to go down and does not affect our project here, so I suggest it be avoided
for the time being.
4. Subsistence? No.
Subsistence, Henry argues, is said with an “improper meaning in God insofar as it
depends on character of the name, because what subsists in God does not stand under
something, neither under a higher universal nor under accidents, as is the case in
creatures…but person rather subsists by itself in the essence.”138 So, God does not
subsist absolutely. But we might say properly that God the Father does have subsistence
in a restricted sense. Namely, ‘as a person’ not ‘as a substance.’
5. Substance? No.
God the Father does not ‘stand under’ as a supposite for accidents, generation, and
decay. His perfection excludes his nature from having this quality. Again, as with natural
thing, the case does get complicated if considering the human manifestation of Christ,
the son.
6. Supposite? No.
God the Father is not a supposite, in the absolute sense, for the same reason he is
not a singular or an individual. These terms imply the existence of accidents,
particularity under universals, and all other fore mentioned imperfections.
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7. Individual? No.
God, including the person of the Father, is not the sort of being to which ‘individuum,’ as contrary to non-individual and related to a universal, can properly refer.
8. Person? Yes.
God the Father, as such, is by necessity a ‘person’ for the same reasons Jonah is
considered as such, plus the added degree of perfection brought about by its use rather
than any of the other terms. It is necessary to think and speak about him in this manner,
because it is the only term available to us which captures the meaning of
incommunicability we are after.
Let us notice what Henry has established, after viewing his discussion alongside
this analysis: the uniqueness of the term ‘person,’ because of the implications and
nuance it contains, and the specialization of its use and meaning which is necessary for
the proper concept formation and signification of God. In so doing, he has resolved the
problems posed at the outset, as well as established his own working definition of
personhood for use in his teachings to follow. He has addressed his first problemdemonstrating the distinctions which explain the language originally chosen by Boethius
and the corrections made by Richard of St. Victor. He has rephrased the second problem
of Augustine’s remark from ‘in order that one might be silent’ to “on account of the
novelty of the use of the name.”139 Thus, Henry reasons, Augustine was not actually
answering the heretics who posed the question, but those believers who might
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understand, and thus “be freed from their attack without the confusion they would
have incurred through silence.”
We begin to see, here in his concluding remarks, the real thrust of his discussion.
Yes, he is addressing the specific difficulties posed to the treatment of person set forth
by Boethius and Augustine. Yes, he is expanding upon the need and efficiency of the
correction made by Richard of St. Victor. But indirectly, through his examination of the
eight terms, he has drawn attention to the development of the term person as a
linguistic/mental tool. He concludes the question with a telling quote from Richard:
“Those who first transferred this name ‘person’ to God did so out of necessity,” but
under the knowing and purposeful guidance of the Holy Spirit who knew the specialized
meaning it could cultivate. And thus, Richard continues, “we are seeking not the
understanding with which human beings first imposed” the term, “nor the necessity out
of which it was transferred to God, but the truth with which it was inspired…in those
who transferred it and has been used universally” ever since. In other words, Henry
believes that the proper use of the proper term (the proper connection between word
and thing) can result in the proper mental concept. (Thus, we have unexpectedly found
a statement on Henry’s philosophy of language and human knowledge by way of his
views on the relationship between words, thoughts, and things!) This is what I mean by
my thesis of an epistemic turn. According to Henry, using the term ‘person’ to refer to
God allows us to think and talk about God’s perfection, and makes possible the
distinctions necessary by which to do so.
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At the close of Chapter 3, On Relation, I proposed that a thorough accounting of
Henry’s framework of the issues should be able to answer the following questions about
the status of universals, individuals, relations, and persons: Are they real? (Do they exist
in the world in individual objects?) Or, are they mental concepts? (Do they exist in the
mind alone as verbal/cognitive tools?) And how do they each apply to created and
uncreated beings? Our investigation into the first question of the fifty-third article of
Henry’s Summa has produced insight into his solutions.
According to this text, we can say the following about Henry’s treatment of the
terms: All four terms (universal, individual, relation, and person) pick out something real
in the world outside the mind. Individual (and therefore also universal), relation, and
person can all properly be said to apply to created beings, so long as they fulfill the
adequate criteria. However, individual and universal do not apply to the uncreated
being of God, since God’s unity does not allow for the matter/form dichotomy necessary
for the individual/universal hierarchy. Only relation and person apply properly to God,
and they do so as necessary, essential qualities of the divine nature.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Many of Henry’s ideas have attracted the attention of contemporary scholars.
For example, B. Tierney has recently written about Henry’s notion of human rights, an
idea that influenced his own distinctions between absolute and ordained powers but
may have also influenced William of Ockham in his inquiries into the power of civilian
rule. In 1993, R. Teske published English translations of certain questions, in which
Henry treats the human will, that have received a great deal of interest and mention. R.
Pasnau recently (2002) published translations of two questions from Henry’s Summa for
The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts.

That there is a renewed interest in Henry’s thought is evidenced by the two
international conferences which took place in 1996 and 2003 and were devoted entirely
to Henry’s theories. (The proceedings of which have each subsequently been published.)
In his two-volume work on science and knowledge of God in the thirteenth century
(2000), S. Marrone devotes a quarter of his attention solely to the thought of Henry of
Ghent. In 2003, Blackwell’s A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages was
published, which included a lengthy article by R. Wielockx about the overall views of the

Solemn Doctor. Since that time, Gordon Wilson edited the Brill Companion to
Henry of Ghent, which is already garnering a great deal of interest and reference.
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Others have taken note of Henry’s defense of academic freedom for the masters
at Paris when the Bishop of Paris attempted to influence and restrict certain topics of
discussion at the University, the fact that Henry maintained (contrary to the prominent
opinions of his day) that women do have something substantial to contribute to their
offspring, and his quite original consideration of whether, even in a just war, a civilian
has an absolute obligation to fight.

It is not difficult to imagine how the idea of ‘person’ relates to each of these
issues as well as the project of understanding his larger philosophy, and is therefore,
worthy of more careful and comprehensive scholarly attention alongside the rest of his
work. Examining that idea in his thought must include an evaluation of his Summa,
article 53, question 1. Alongside the significance this project holds for Henry scholarship
specifically, there is a broader application to be acknowledged.

Contemporary philosophy is filled with debates about personhood. Namely, the
status of being a person. The consequences of the controversy are pervasive and
significant to a broad range of our current intellectual endeavors. In ethics, for example,
we see concerns over the rights of a fetus or non-human animals. In modern theology,
there is current importance being given to the notion of the ‘Acting Person.’140 Professor
Christopher Tollefsen has put forth a number of impressive works on the subject of first
person knowledge and persons in relation to Bioethics.141 There are political/legal issues
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regarding corporate personhood, ontological discussions of machines and artificial
intelligence, epistemic problems of agency and performance, and so on. In Western
philosophy, there are a number of definitions given for the meaning of the word
“person” with no established consensus in sight. So, there is value in studying the
historical development of the problem, if nothing else, in order that we might
understand and take into account the different philosophical traditions now converging
upon the topic. Of those traditions, perhaps, none is more influential to what we’ve
inherited than that of the medieval Christian thinkers.
A forthcoming article on the subject, by Anthony F. Shaker, begins with the
following observation: “The word person conjures up the idea of an irreducibly unique
individual. As natural as this association may appear to us, it hides developments that
have been underway for two and half millennia. …The medieval period brought the
concept of personhood more clearly than ever within the purview of philosophical
inquiry.”142 This is true because Christianity is arguably the first philosophical system to
use the word “person” in its modern sense.143 And the medieval period was largely a
dialogue and working out between Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers. Drawing on
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its Greco-Roman roots, the word “persona” was used by early Church fathers who
transferred the meaning from its original theatrical use to a more technical, theological
characterization of a triune God. Tertullian’s work, Adversus Praxean (‘Against Praxeas’)
stands as one of the first examples of this. It was later refined by Boethius and
continued to be developed throughout the Middle Ages. So let us reflect upon the
development in Article 53 of Henry’s Summa.
Boethius defined person as “a rational being of an individual nature.” And while
Henry incorporates much of the Boethian tradition into his own views, he nevertheless
makes a change for his own definition by substituting the notion of ‘incommunicability’
for ‘individual.’ This is representative of exactly the sort of philosophical development
that Jorge Gracia attributes to the thirteenth century. Namely, a move from purely
metaphysical concerns over the principle of individuation towards a more nuanced
approach, sensitive to corresponding issues like the epistemological matter of
indexicals, the realist/nominalist debate, and the movement towards Aristotelian logical
concerns.
Comprised of ten questions concerning ‘Those Things That Pertain to the
Distinction of the Persons’, the first question asks ‘Whether it is necessary to hold that
there is a person in God.’ Is it necessary, Henry investigates, to think and speak of the
divine in terms of personhood, or is there a better option available to us? His approach
to this question consists of an examination of the 8 terms which he takes to be the most
relevant and applicable possibilities available for dealing with the notion of said
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distinctions in our concept of the divine. Other than the term “persona,” which he
admits has a seemingly problematic history, he considers the terms ‘hoc aliquid’ (this
something), ‘singulare’ (singular), ‘res naturae’ (natural thing), ‘subsistare’ (subsistence),
‘substancia’ (substance), ‘suppositum’ (supposite), and ‘individuum’ (individual)- asking
of each ‘does this term do a better job at referencing the divine, and our concept of the
divine, than the term person does?’144
One by one, Henry demonstrates a weakness of each term in sufficing to capture
the proper triune aspect of God’s nature. Except one. ‘Persona,’ he concludes, is the
only term available which has a unique enough meaning to succeed in the task. It serves
as a unique placeholder, linguistically and conceptually, for conveying the
incommunicable aspect of the essential nature of certain created and uncreated
beings.145
Hence, our analysis to accompany the exegesis. We have considered the text as
it was originally intended- a classroom lecture for advanced students which would serve
as a jumping off point for a larger, more sophisticated analysis of ideas. I suggest we
think of this article as a textbook that Henry wrote for his students to use during the
course of his teaching. Understood in this way, we can allow ourselves to imagine the
sort of discussion and exercise that would have arisen from the material. Using the text
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of the question as a foundation, the analysis considers the implications of what such a
list of terms entails. I argue that Henry must have used this question as a way to
encourage an exercise of comparison and contrast between the eight terms considered,
and furthermore, that that exercise necessarily leads to a certain conclusion about the
uniqueness of personhood. Without walking through those steps, ourselves, we might
miss the procedural element of his argument, or worse, the ultimate force of his
conclusion.
I have reconstructed what I take to be his scholastic project, based solely upon
the text itself. I’ve done so in the following manner: by 1.) considering each term by
itself and in relation to “persona,” and 2.) by considering each term as it applies to
different types of beings. So, for example, I lay out a comparison of supposite and
person according to, and restricted to, what Henry claims about each term in this
particular question. Based upon what he says, we can ask ‘Are all supposites persons?’
and ‘Are all persons supposites?’ The same exercise is carried out between individual
and person, and so on, for each term included in his list. This is followed by a
consideration of how the terms would apply, again based solely on Henry’s presentation
of each, to the divine being, a human being, and a non-rational animal. For example, is
God a supposite and an individual and a person? And so on…
These two procedures, or exercises, serve to bolster the claims of my thesis.
They flesh out in greater detail what may not be immediately obvious from the words of
the text, but yet are nevertheless apparent when a closer look is taken. Namely, Henry’s
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conclusions about the uniqueness and necessity of personhood, as a linguistic tool and
conceptual framework, for dealing with the problem of the divine nature.
The Trinitarian concerns posed by this question, alongside the philosophical
problems they imply, led Henry to develop a treatment of distinctions as conceptual
tools, necessary for making the proper connections between words, thoughts, and
things. The need to draw mental distinctions between persons and substances, the
possibility of holding persons and individuals as separate ideas, the acknowledgment of
a difference between our notions of persons and natural things…These conceptual
challenges require the same distinguishing capability from the language they
accompany. In short, considering the distinction of the divine persons pushes Henry to
consider the act of distinction itself.
In summary, we have established Henry’s position in context with the traditions
he inherited- demonstrating the ways in which it is an original contribution, how it is
distinct from the positions held by his contemporaries, and why it represents the
epistemic shift that scholars like Jorge J.E. Gracia attribute to the University system of
the 13th and 14th centuries.
I situated Henry’s discussion of divine personhood alongside his teachings on
relation which highlighted the difference between his treatment of a purely
metaphysical issue and one which he takes to require linguistic and logical
considerations.
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And I have provided a thorough exegesis and analysis of the text at hand,
working through his examination of the terms … as the systematic exercise it was
intended. In so doing, I’ve shown how the epistemic implications of the subject become
an integral part of Henry’s framework.
Thus, we see that Question 1, Article 53 of his Summa represents an unexpected
epistemic sensitivity in the teachings of Henry of Ghent.
Our concept of a person, and the way we use that term to refer, has come under
challenge by recent classifications of ‘non-human persons,’ legislative proposals that
cooperation’s be categorized as ‘persons,’ the on-going debate over when a fetus
becomes a ‘person,’ and so on… As a result, there exists in philosophy (as well as the
general public) a great deal of reflection about the ways in which this term, and our
understanding of it, are developing. T. Beauchamp posits, in his article on Problems in
Theories of Metaphysical Personhood, that the dispute is “created by the vagueness and
the inherently contestable nature of the ordinary language concept of person.”146
Beauchamp’s writings focus mainly on the ways in which the concept of metaphysical
personhood fails or succeed in comparison with contemporary concerns, such as the
categorization of non-human persons. But his concerns, and those like his, may also be
viewed through the lens of the medieval debate. In a similar abstract from The Failure of
Theories of Personhood, Beauchamp states that the problem is inherent in the “common
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Beauchamp, p.319. See also English (1975) for an early and influential analysis of this problem, as well
as DeGrazia (1996, esp. pp.305-15).
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sense concept of person as, roughly speaking, identical with the concept of human
being.”147
Our modern concerns about the definition of person, albeit situated in different
context and applied to different subject matter, are relevant to the medieval project of
personhood and discussions like Henry’s on the definition of person in the context of
divine persons in the Christian Trinity. Henry, as we have seen, was careful to distinguish
between the object in existence, or subject of reference, and the term used to talk, and
think, about that subject. We gain further understanding, through an investigation of
this text, how certain roots of our contemporary concept of a person can be traced back
to the Medieval period. And, whether he was correct in his theories, we can learn from
his approach to the philosophical problem- namely, the importance of carefully defining
our terms and distinguishing the meanings of the names we use when engaging in
epistemic and metaphysical disputes alike.
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APPENDIX A:
LOOKING FORWARD- DISTINCTION IN ARTICLE 53
The Middle Ages of Western Philosophy are marked by the intersection of
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought. And theirs was largely a conversation about the
nature of God. What does it mean to speak of one, true God? How can a triune God be
unified? What is the nature of God’s personhood? These questions propelled the
medieval debate forward, and like most rigorous philosophical pursuits, gave rise to the
need for distinction. Used as a tool for refinement, the ability to draw distinctions offers
the conceptual and linguistic power necessary for organizing an ever-expanding set of
ideas. The schoolmen of the Medieval University not only employed the use of
distinction but turned their gaze directly towards it examining the thing itself.
Henry’s contribution to the matter garnered a great deal of interest from his
contemporaries and sparked a great deal of debate amongst his predecessors. So, the
title of article fifty-three alone, ‘On Those Things That Pertain to the Distinction of the
Persons,’ ought to coax our curiosity. It is here that Henry moves from an examination
of the term ‘person’ to a discussion of whether that term signifies a thing or an
‘intention.’ Hence, this article demonstrates a link of development between Henry’s
Trinitarian views and one of his most notorious ideas- what Roland Teske referred to as
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‘a hallmark of Henry’s metaphysics’- the intentional distinction.148 A thorough
accounting of the first question in the article would be remiss not to include a
preliminary acknowledgement of that link.
Henry’s teachings on distinction categorize the act, or operation, into three types
according to the sorts of things they are meant to distinguish: real distinctions, rational
distinctions, and intentional distinctions. Definitions of each, along with examples and
category criteria, are spread throughout Henry’s writings. While there are lingering
questions about subcategories and possible inconsistencies within Henry’s own use of
terminology, much effort has been put forth to present a coherent summation of his
very complicated conceptual schema. The following is a rough sketch of what we can
say about Henry’s understanding of each distinction type:
I.

Real Distinction (distinctio realis)

Henry defines a real distinction as the sort of distinction between things (res), that
is, between two substances or between a substance and its quality or quantity. (Either
as absolute from both sides or relative from one side.) The criteria for a real distinction
is met when really different things must imply diverse natures or essences, whether
simple or composite, in terms of reality. Really similar things must imply the same thing,
such that one does not add anything real to the other. By ‘thing’ Henry means here
“whatever is some absolute nature and essence that has an exemplar idea in God, able
to come into existence by the divine operation.”149 (P.236n45) Such a thing is a thing
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derived from ratification or validation; it has being of essence (insofar as God is its
exemplary cause), but does not have being of existence unless God causes it to exist in
reality through efficient causality. For example, composites, like man and donkey, or
principles of composites, like matter and form. A definition and the thing defined are
examples of real sameness. Likewise, the divine attributes are really the same. A dog
and a houseplant, however, are really distinct.
Relations are not things. Hence, a relation is distinct from the substance that has
being only intentionally, not really. By ‘real’ Henry means ‘having possible existence.’150
(Which is different from the use of the term by Aquinas to imply ‘actual existence.’)
Henry refers to a real distinction between essence and existence as compared with
Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Matters are complicated by Henry’s views on metaphysics
and physics- the former considering primary essences, the latter devoted to really
existing things. “Separability and inseparability are tied to the various sorts of
distinctions and provide quite different grounds for a real distinction at the
metaphysical and the physical planes of consideration.” 151
II.

Rational Distinction (distinctio rationalis)

Henry defines a rational distinction as the sort of distinction that is purely mental or
in no way real. Things that are distinct merely rationally can be mutually predicated of
each other. There must be inseparability in reality and in the mind for two things to be
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considered rationally distinct.152 An example of this would be the divine attributes,
which are really identical, are only rationally distinct. A definition and the thing defined
are only rationally distinct. Henry also seems to categorize relation and divine essence
as rational distinctions.153 (Here, reason is used in a technical sense, and does not
include ‘a certain cognitive power of an intellectual substance from which our soul is
called rational,’ nor does it mean ‘reason in accord with certitude about something
doubtful.’
III.

Intentional Distinction (distinctio intentionalis)

Henry defines an intentional distinction as a distinction between two intentions in a
single thing, one of which does not include the other. An intention (as Henry uses the
term) is a note, or trait, of the essential content of a res, which does not differ from it in
any real sense, nor from its other identifiable notes, yet can nevertheless be expressed
by an independent concept.154) The intentions really exist in the res, but potentially,
whereas the distinction is an operation of the intellect alone. Things that differ
intentionally are really the same but differ insofar as the mind forms different concepts
of them, yet concepts that cannot be predicated of each other, and therefore, are not
purely rational distinctions. ‘Intentions and the intentional distinction thus track the
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“But here an intention is called something really pertaining to the simplicity of an essence, which can
be separately conceived without something else, from which it does not differ by an absolute thing and
which pertains to the same thing. Hence, an intention is said to be a tending within (intus tentio), because
by its concept the mind tends to something that is in a thing and not to something else that is something
pertaining to the same thing. And in that way the intellect, to which it pertains to divide those things that
are the same in reality, forms diverse concepts of the same thing, as concerning elements diverse within
the conception of the mind, but concerning ones the same in reality.” (N55p238)
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internal ontological structure of an object.’155 Henry scholars now agree that the idea of
an intentional distinction is tributary to Avicenna, the terminology having been taken
directly from Avicenna’s Metaphysics. (chapter 5, book 1) (ftnt.82)
Intentional difference applies to inseparability in the same thing but separability in
different things.156 “A diversity of intentions can exist only between those that are
united according to reality so that the concept of one completely excludes the concept
of the other.”157 In this way, the intentional distinction looks identical to the rational,
purely logical, type. The only difference is that in the intentional cases, one of the
concepts excludes the other (can be thought of separately/independently from each
other), whereas the concepts of a rational distinction are compatible. So, this means (as
Henry was aware) that everything that differs in intention also differs in reason, but not
vice versa. Examples include diverse differences in one species, like vegetative and
sensitive elements, which cannot be separated from the individual animal, but can be
separated from other animals and plants. ‘Animal’ and ‘rational’ are intentionally
distinct in a single human being. So, the intentional distinction is not necessarily just an
intermediate stage between the real and purely rational types.158
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The standard organization of medieval theories of distinction parallels Henry of Ghent and Thomas
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Given the above schema, the subject of article fifty-three raises the question
‘What sort of distinction is the distinction of a person?’ Does Henry understand the case
of the divine persons as representing a real, rational, or intentional distinction? Because
his categorizations are based upon the things they distinguish, answering this question
should also provide an account of Henry’s notion of personhood as it fits into his
metaphysical ontology. Does he view it as a thing or a figment of the mind, or something
else? Unpacking these questions requires us to extend our reach beyond the first
question, and is therefore, beyond the scope of this project. But question one bears
valuable fruit nonetheless. Besides containing an unexpected epistemic turn, it
establishes a point of intersection between some of Henry’s most significant ideas- his
notion of relation, his understanding of individuation, his view of personhood, and his
teachings on the intentional distinction. It is interesting where this initial examination of
the eight terms leads. In question five, Henry takes up the matter of whether ‘person’
signifies a thing or an intention and this early treatment of the uniqueness of
personhood becomes the groundwork for his solution.
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APPENDIX B:
POINTS OF INTEREST FOR FURTHER STUDY
As the first formal exegesis and analysis to be undertaken of Henry’s Summa
(Quaestiones Ordinariae), art. 53, question 1, the future of the project is multi-faceted.
First and foremost, it contributes to a fuller and more accurate understanding of the
teachings and writings of Henry of Ghent, namely his philosophical treatment of
‘person.’ But there are several other interesting ideas emerging from the lines of this
project. While they are beyond the scope of our purposes here, I would be remiss not to
point them out.
I include here a brief mention of the following points for further consideration:
I.

Medieval Notions of Form & Matter

II.

Abelard & Henry as Nominalists?

III.

Ongoing Disputes About Relation

IV.

Henry as an Empirical Realist?

V.

Concept Formation

VI.

From ‘Persona’ to Personal Identity

131

I.

Medieval Notions of Form and Matter
One such theme is that of the relationship between body and soul, or more

precisely for medieval thinkers, between matter and form. Much has been written
about Descartes’ debt to Medieval philosophy, so I will not make that case here. But, it
is important, in those discussions to acknowledge the Scholastic tradition with accuracy.
Given the attention paid to Descartes’ response to Scotus and Ockham, and
furthermore, their being influenced by Henry, it stands to reason that those inquiries
should also take Henry’s teachings into serious account as a point of development in the
philosophical treatment of form and matter. In attempting to reconcile Augustine and
Aristotle (with others, mentioned here) Henry posits a theory of matter and form as a
hylomorphic compound. While it has been well established what he has to say regarding
the human being and divine persons elsewhere (taken from those texts available), his
discussion of the divine persons in art.53 is certainly relevant to his overall thoughts on
the issue of person and the unity of essence. And, therefore, should be included in these
studies.
Just as modern thinkers have inherited the dualistic account of Descartes, Henry
and his medieval contemporaries inherited a dualistic form of Platonism, which defined
the human being as a ‘rational soul using a mortal body,’ thereby distinguishing
between the material and immaterial elements assumed in that understanding of the
person. Yet, Henry also inherited Augustine and Aquinas’ rejections of that dualism- due
to concerns over the interaction of separate/distinct substances. While these concerns
will eventually lead to the philosophical materialists, Henry provides a unique
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perspective of a transitional moment in the discussion, namely the metaphysics of
hylomorphic compounds. In his oft-cited work, Body and Soul, Peter King pays special
attention to what Henry has to say about this issue, stating that his is a particularly
‘instructive case.’ As King notes, Henry’s development of a full theory of the plurality of
substantial forms in human beings (of which I argue his discussions of divine persons
relate) represents an effort, in the final years of the 13th century, ‘to clarify the
Augustinian solution and make it precise in an Aristotelian framework…as part of the
larger project of getting clear about the metaphysics of form/matter composites.’ We
see this taking place in article 53, regarding the definition of person when applied to the
divine.
II.

Abelard and Universals
Abelard is considered one of the first examples of nominalism, or perhaps more

accurately irrealism159, in the Western tradition. In defense of his theory of universals,
Abelard argued that there cannot be any real object in the world which could satisfy
Boethius’s criteria for the property, and therefore, universality is not an ontological
feature of the world but a semantic feature of language. This lies at the heart of
Abelard’s metaphysics, but clearly, also develops what we might now describe as his
philosophy of language. The notion that ‘universals are nothing more than words’ raised
the objection that common names, if not the names of common items, would be
rendered meaningless. (This is where Abelard thought his teacher, Roscelin had gone
astray by holding that universals were ‘mere mouth noises.’) Abelard is careful, to avoid
159
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the same mistake, to distinguish between the semantic property of a names reference
(nominatio- what the term applies to) and that of its sense (significatio- what hearing
the term suggests; or doctrino- the informational content of the concept which is meant
to be conveyed). In this way, Abelard’s philosophy of language is then linked with his
notion of concept formation/intellect, and therefore, a certain philosophy of mind. This
is, interestingly, like the epistemological sensitivities we see Henry demonstrating in his
discussion of the divine persons. When claiming what he does about universals as a
linguistic phenomenon, Abelard gives a ‘contextual explication of intentionality that
relies on a linguistic account of mental representation, adopting a principle of
compositionality for understanding.’160 He concludes that mental images must have an
instrumental role in the thought process, but only as intermediary signs of things
(intersigna rerum). Intentionality derives, instead, from the act of attention directed
towards the mental image. Again, a similar treatment of names and signification is seen
in article 53.
These theories kept Abelard in contention long after his death, including their
mention (albeit not by direct reference) in the Condemnation of 1277- of which Henry
was a part of composing! And, in his own lifetime, Abelard engaged in debates with the
anti-dialecticians. Bernard of Clairvaux, and others, claimed that the meaning of a
proposition of the faith, to the extent that it can be grasped, is plain and without the
need of aid from reason. Abelard, despite the contention, continued his attempt to
show how religious claims can be understood, and how the applications of dialectical
160

Ibid. section 5.

134

methods might help in that development. (This is similar to Richard of St. Victor, and
what we see in article 53 of Henry’s Summa.)
Besides the conflict over reason, there were also Trinitarian implications to
Abelard’s nominalism which were viewed as problematic/heretical by the Church and
certain University Masters. In matters of the Trinity, Abelard concluded that Boethius’
account of identity needed work if it was to accurately capture the true nature of the
divine. Derived from Boethius, this traditional account holds that things may be either
generically, specifically, or numerically the same or different. Abelard categorizes
identity by four modes: essential sameness and difference, (closely tied to essential…)
numerical sameness and difference, definitional sameness and difference, and
sameness and difference in property. He held that two things are the same in essence
when they are numerically the same concrete thing, and essentially different otherwise.
Yet, noted, numerical difference does not match up precisely with essential difference.
According to Abelard, since things may be neither the same nor different, numerically,
the question ‘How many things are there?’ is ill-formed. When this is applied to the
Trinity the result is: three persons who are essentially the same as one another, (same
concrete thing- God) but differ in definition (what it is to be the Father is different from
the Son). The persons are numerically different from one another though and each have
at least one unique property from the others. This path through metaphysics, language,
and mind- applied to the Trinity- is quite similar to what we find in Henry’s Summa,
art.53. Though, to my knowledge, no one has pointed this out or examined the
correlation in a formal capacity. Now that this study has been undertaken, such a
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comparison is possible, and would be an interesting opportunity for a deeper analysis of
both thinkers.
III.

Ongoing Disputes About Relation
I believe Henry’s discussion in this text is pertinent to the recent work of Scott

M. Williams. In his 2012 article, Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The
Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity, Williams argues that “there is a hitherto
unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and
his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity.
Critiquing the debate between Mark Henninger and Jos Decorte concerning the nature
of the divine persons of the Trinity, Williams makes the case that Henninger’s
articulation of relation is to be preferred as more consistent with Henry’s own
understanding of the term. While Williams’s paper focuses specifically on Henry’s notion
of relation, the same arguments might be extended to his notion of personhood in a
similar manner. Getting clear on Henry’s teachings about the divine person in this
section of the Summa (which is not mentioned by Williams) would certainly help to
clarify and add textual support to one side of this debate or the other. (I believe it adds
credence to Henninger’s articulation of Henry’s notion of relation, while may complicate
certain statements that Williams makes about Henry’s use of the term ‘person’ more
generally.) I do not believe, taking this portion of text as an example, that we can say
yet, with absolute certainty, what Henry’s definitive understanding of ‘person’ was, or if
he even fully developed a consistent theory as such. I think studies like these (as well as
Williams’) are necessary, though, for moving us in that direction.
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IV.

Henry As An Empirical Realist?
Another interesting possibility for further research which has arisen from this

study is, as mentioned earlier, the connection between the mind/body dualism of
Descartes and the form/matter composition that Henry constructs. In an article of
Franziskanische Studien, Gordon Wilson considers a relation between Henry’s theory of
the unity of Man to Descartes’ unity of composition.161 Wilson concludes with this
observation: ‘It certainly is not contended here that either (Henry/Descartes) fully
elaborated or that either thinker was fully conscious of the direction to which his
thought was leading him. Yet within the philosophies of both thinkers there is an
undeniable, although not elaborated, suggestion of the doctrine of what Kant would
describe as empirical realism.’ Having now examined Henry’s treatment of the divine
persons in article 53 of his Summa, we may be able to say that Henry was more aware of
such implications than once assumed.162 Or, at the very least, have more textual support
with which to consider the possibility.
V.

Concept Formation
The issue of personhood impacts Henry’s thoughts on concept formation since

the second person of the Trinity is, of course, the ‘Word.’ Henry understood the human
ability to form concepts as related to the Fathers ability to produce the Word. (The
Father does not actually have vocal chords, so this word is purely conceptual.) This
connection, albeit interesting, is beyond the scope of our project here. But I mention it
161
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as an aside since it may be another, unexpected epistemological ramification of Henry’s
Trinitarian thought. For further insight into Henry’s thought on the subject, I
recommend the following works by Russel Friedman, Bernd Goehring, and Juan Carlos
Flores (All of whom have contributed a helpful clarity to this very complicated subject.):
FRIEDMAN, R.
-

Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham Cambridge 2010.

FLORES, J. C.
-

-

“Intellect and Will as Natural Principles,” in Henry of Ghent and the
Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte, edd.
Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, (Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2003), pp.
277- 306.
Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,
Series 1) XXVI (Leuven, 2006), viii+239pp.
“Henry of Ghent on the Trinity” in A Companion to Henry of Ghent, (Brill’s
Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 23), ed. Gordon Wilson (Leiden,
2011), pp. 135-150.

GOEHRING, B.
-

-

-

Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation, Cornell University,
(diss.) 2006.
“Intelligit se intelligere rem intellectam: Henry of Ghent on Thought and
Reflexivity,” in Quaestio: The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 10, (2010),
pp. 111- 133.
“Henry of Ghent on the Verbum Mentis” in A Companion to Henry of Ghent,
(Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 23), ed. Gordon Wilson
(Leiden, 2011), pp. 241-272.
“Henry of Ghent on Human Knowledge and Its Limits,” in Quaestio: The Yearbook
of the History of Metaphysics 12, (2012), pp. 25-49.
“Henry of Ghent’s Use of Aristotle’s De anima in Developing His Theory of
Cognition,” in Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Anima, eds. Russel
FRIEDMAN and Jean-Michel COUNET, (Philosophes Médiévaux) 58 (Leuven –
Paris, 2013), pp.63-99.
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VI.

From ‘Persona’ to Personal Identity
This project, including the text with which it is engaged, is fundamentally a study

of personhood. By personhood, I mean that it involves a philosophical approach to the
problem of personal identity. This is, both historically and analytically, a very
complicated, broad-reaching problem and many approaches to it have been taken. One
may, for example, take the problem of personal identity to involve metaphysical
questions about the nature of a person, i.e. questions like ‘Who am I?’ or ‘What am I
constituted of?’ Or, one may refer to personal-identity in terms of persistence (what
does it take for a person to remain the same through time?), evidence (how do we find
out who is who?), difference (Could I have been other than I am?), or the ethical (Why
does it matter?). Personal identity, rather than being a straightforward, simple problem,
is really a myriad of loosely connected ones. In his Summa, article 53, q.1 Henry
approaches the problem from the standpoint of personhood- essentially, asking for the
definition of the word person. (For example, what is it to be a person? Or, what is
necessary and suffices for something to be called a person rather than something else?)
We see, in question 1, Henry considering this question in terms of the divine
persons, namely, can we say that the divine is a person/s. Besides being concerned with
the definition of person, we might say that Henry is also concerned with issues of
population, insofar as he is asking how many persons may populate a single essence, or
to be precise, how can a monotheistic God be considered as a triune compound of
persons? (In contemporary scholarship, this is sometimes called ‘synchronic identity’.
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See Stanford Personhood). The notion of personhood, for today’s society (rather than
just those who are engaged with the historical/medieval discussions above), is of utmost
importance and expanding in the subject matter to which it applies.
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